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ABSTRACT
Despite the strong judicial policy in favor of stare decisis-the norm
of adhering to past precedent when approaching newer cases-the
Supreme Court, in past decades, has not hesitated to overturn anti-
trust doctrines that were, in its view, no longer consistent with the
goals of antitrust law and sound economic theory. Even after wide-
spread acknowledgement of this trend by both the Court and com-
mentators, the trend of a modified stare decisis in the realm of
antitrust finds contradictory expression in the cases and leaves open
serious jurisprudential questions. This Article addresses that void by
analyzing the major relevant Supreme Court antitrust cases and iso-
lating and critiquing the justifications given for departures from stare
decisis. The Article argues that while it is undesirable to abruptly
overrule antitrust precedent on the basis of contemporary economic
trends, gradually departing from precedent is justified as part of the
evolution of antitrust principles in much the same way as it occurs in
other common law fields. Finally, this Article suggests three ways in
which courts-including the Supreme Court-can continue to de-
velop antitrust law while avoiding sharp doctrinal breaks with stare
decisis and the detriments associated with a lack thereof
I. INTRODUCTION
Students of introductory antitrust courses are exposed to a body of
doctrine characterized by distinctly sharp and disjunctive contours.
Unlike many other areas of the law, the body of federal antitrust law
that has developed over the past 120 years is marked by numerous
seemingly sudden adoptions and abandonments of substantive rules of
law. In past decades, the Supreme Court has not hesitated to overturn
antitrust doctrines that were, in its view, no longer consistent with
sound competition policy or economic theory. What has resulted is a
historical continuum of case law adopting certain rules and tests only
to have those tests wiped away years or sometimes decades later. De-
spite the strong general judicial policy in favor of stare decisis-the
norm of adhering to past precedent when approaching newer cases-
the Supreme Court has expressly and impliedly opted to revise and
reexamine the antitrust laws on numerous occasions.' While antitrust
law's need to keep up with the rapidly changing pace of business and
technology may require it to possess an enhanced degree of flexibility,
it cannot be denied that a large break with stare decisis tends to erode
the appearance of the rule of law and leave business entities hope-
lessly uncertain.
1. See infra Part II.
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Following in the footsteps of the Supreme Court, scholars now take
it for granted that stare decisis has a somewhat modified application in
the area of antitrust. Though certain notable exceptions have per-
sisted in the case law, scholars and practitioners are no longer sure
that any particular rule or doctrine will survive the next grant of certi-
orari. While some scholars have highlighted the benefits and appro-
priateness of such a modified stare decisis in the antitrust realm,
others have cited this trend with disapproval. Notable names in the
field rely on this tendency to direct the crosshairs and divine what
now-pass6 antitrust doctrine may be up next for retirement.2
Despite the widespread acknowledgement of this trend by both the
Court and commentators, the idea of a modified stare decisis in the
realm of antitrust remains to be fully addressed on its own terms. For
one thing, the decision to override the normal rigors of stare decisis in
any field is serious enough to warrant additional scrutiny and evalua-
tion. Moreover, to the extent that the Supreme Court has grappled
with this point-both explicitly and implicitly-the Court has failed to
present a single and coherent justification for this practice or to apply
the practice in a uniform manner. In fact, the Court has even contra-
dicted itself, at times applying the strong form of stare decisis associ-
ated with statutory interpretation, while other times treating the
Sherman Act as an open-ended common law statute. This Article
tackles the question of stare decisis in antitrust by bringing together
and analyzing what the Court has actually said-and to what ends-in
major antitrust cases over the last few decades in the process of over-
ruling formerly controlling legal rules. In doing so, the Article tracks
the major relevant Supreme Court cases, isolates the various justifica-
tions for departures from stare decisis in antitrust, and gathers alterna-
tive understandings and insights into this trend.3 In addition, this
Article critically considers the strengths and weaknesses of those justi-
fications and proposes ways in which antitrust jurisprudence may
avoid some of the problems that stem from a perceived lack of stare
decisis and the benefits associated therewith.4
In particular, this Article's analysis focuses on the distinction be-
tween abrupt overrulings based upon new economic theory-such as
finding pro-competitive benefits in places where none were recog-
nized earlier-and overrulings based upon doctrinal refinement. The
latter occur, for example, when the Supreme Court acts to ensure that
the legal scheme of antitrust continues to function in a smooth manner
2. See infra Part II.
3. See infra Part II.
4. See infra Parts III & IV.
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consistent with the goals of the antitrust laws. This Article explores
the Supreme Court's understanding of the Sherman Act as a "com-
mon law statute"5 and the history of that adage. The Article con-
cludes that it is undesirable to overrule established antitrust precedent
without adequately addressing the stare decisis concerns generally
recognized in common law fields. Likewise, it is inappropriate to rely
on the "common law statute" maxim to hastily displace precedent on
the sole basis of alternative economic understandings.
Part II.A of this Article provides a brief overview of the doctrine of
stare decisis, followed by an synopsis of the now widely accepted un-
derstanding of its weaker applicability in antitrust in Part II.B. Part
II.C closely reads the relevant precedents to parse out what the Court
has both said and done in the process of repealing outdated antitrust
doctrine. This elucidation focuses on a handful of major Supreme
Court decisions since the 1970s that are most frequently cited as either
expressly recognizing a diminished stare decisis in antitrust or effec-
tively undermining longstanding antitrust principles. Part II.C also in-
cludes a discussion of the most noteworthy-and perhaps infamous-
of the exceptions to the notion of a diminished stare decisis in anti-
trust. Part III then analyzes the purported justifications for a weaker
version of stare decisis and weighs the validity of these approaches
under both policy and economic standards. Finally, Part IV concludes
by suggesting ways in which antitrust law can be made more consistent
over time and how the problems associated with frequent departures
from stare decisis can be ameliorated.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Stare Decisis
A complete discussion of stare decisis is both unnecessary to this
Article's argument and beyond the scope of the discussion. However,
it is helpful to engage in a concise review of the concept of stare deci-
sis with the particular goal of understanding the benefits that tend to
derive from a system of law that hues closely to precedent and to high-
light the hardships that result from a lack thereof. This Part also takes
note of the ample scholarly literature that has criticized the doctrine
of stare decisis and emphasized some of its shortcomings. While the
theory and application of stare decisis has engendered tomes of schol-
arship, the general notion that judges should apply prior precedent in
5. See infra Part III.C.
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a consistent way is well-ingrained in American jurisprudence 6 and is
constantly reaffirmed by the legal profession, all the way up to the
justices of the Supreme Court.7 Stare decisis is, in essence, the idea
that cases should be decided on the basis of legal principles articulated
in earlier cases rather than on the basis of novel legal doctrine in each
instance.8 While no two cases can ever be precisely the same, stare
decisis dictates that a court ought to strive to arrive at outcomes in
subsequent cases that are true to the principles and animating con-
cerns established in prior cases.9
Stare decisis can refer to either horizontal or vertical stare decisis.10
Horizontal stare decisis refers to a court's application of its own prece-
dent to newer cases, whereas vertical stare decisis refers to a court's
application of legal precedents developed in higher courts to cases
that come before it.11 There are, however, many nuances in the appli-
cation of stare decisis. Thus, for instance, the Supreme Court has said
that it will more strictly adhere to stare decisis in statutory as opposed
to constitutional issues1 2 and in substantive as opposed to procedural
6. See, e.g., Welch v. Tex. Dep't. of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 478-79 (1987)
("The rule of law depends in large part on adherence to the doctrine of stare decisis. Indeed, the
doctrine is 'a natural evolution from the very nature of our institutions."') (quoting W. M. Lile,
Some Views on the Rule of Stare Decisis, 4 VA. L. REV. 95, 97 (1916)); see also Caleb Nelson,
Stare Decisis and Demonstrably Erroneous Precedents, 87 VA. L. REV. 1, 9-37 (2001) (reviewing
the history of stare decisis in the writings of the founding fathers as well as the early common
law); William o. Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 735 (1949).
7. See, e.g., Barry Friedman, The Wages of Stealth Overruling (With Particular Attention to
Miranda v. Arizona), 99 GEO. L.J. 1, 30 (2010) (collecting quotes from the confirmation hearings
of Justice Roberts and Justice Alito).
8. See Henry J. Friendly, Indiscretion About Discretion, 31 EMORY L.J. 747, 758 (1982) (noting
that it is a "most basic principle of jurisprudence that 'we must act alike in all cases of like
nature."') (quoting Ward v. James, [1966] 1 Q.B. 273, 294 (Can.)); see also BENJAMIN N. CAR-
DOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCEss 33 (1921) ("It will not do to decide the same
question one way between one set of litigants and the opposite way between another.").
9. Some courts have even distinguished between "rule stare decisis," in which a court chooses
what legal rule to apply to cases, and "result stare decisis," which involves applying the legal rule
selected to the facts of newer cases. See Butterworth v. Nat'1 League of Prof'1 Baseball Clubs,
644 So. 2d 1021, 1024 n.7 (Fla. 1994).
10. See, e.g., Joseph W. Mead, Stare Decisis in the Inferior Courts of the United States, 12 NEV.
L.J. 787, 790 (2012).
11. Id. Courts will also often apply the legal principles of other courts with equal, but not
binding, jurisdiction in order to further comity within the legal system. Id.
12. See, e.g., Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 736 (1977) ("[W]e must bear in mind that
considerations of stare decisis weigh heavily in the area of statutory construction, where Con-
gress is free to change this Court's interpretation of its legislation."); see also CSX Transp., Inc. v.
McBride, 131 S. Ct. 2630, 2641 (2011); Hilton v. S.C. Pub. Rys. Comm'n, 502 U.S. 197, 202
(1991); Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406-08 (1932) (Brandeis, J. dissenting);
United States v. Burwell, 690 F.3d 500, 504 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (noting that overruling cases involv-
ing statutory interpretation is limited to a "narrow range" of circumstances). For a general dis-
cussion and history of stare decisis in statutory interpretation, see William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
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issues.13 Further distinctions have also been recognized depending on
which court is involved, for instance in lower courts as opposed to the
United States Supreme Court.14
The basic tension within the concept of stare decisis is a complex
version of the familiar tradeoff inherent in many of the most crucial
dilemmas confronting legislators and judicial decision-makers: effi-
ciency versus fairness. The Supreme Court often invokes the doctrine
of stare decisis, noting, for instance, in Planned Parenthood of South-
eastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, that "no judicial system could do soci-
ety's work if it eyed each issue afresh in every case that raised it."'5
This quote, and many others like it, points to the most simple effi-
ciency justification for stare decisis, namely, that judges would not
have sufficient time and resources to tackle each dispute anew without
being able to conveniently rely on how similar problems have been
worked out in the past. The Court has further recognized stare deci-
sis's "fundamental importance to the rule of law," noting that the pri-
Overruling Statutory Precedents, 76 GEO. L.J. 1361 (1988). The primary purported justification
for heightened stare decisis in statutory interpretation, namely congressional acquiescence as
described in the above quote from Illinois Brick, is also subject to lively and robust scholarly
debate. See, e.g., Randal C. Picker, Takes Two: Stare Decisis in Antitrust, The Per Se Rule
Against Horizontal Price-Fixing, Presented at the ABA Section of Antitrust Law Spring Meeting
(Mar. 27, 2008) (John M. Olin Law & Economics Working Paper No. 398, 2008), available at
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/files/398.pdf (noting that congressional acquiescence "dramat-
ically overstates the ease with which Congress can overturn the Court's statutory interpreta-
tions"); Todd E. Freed, Comment, Is Stare Decisis Still the Lighthouse Beacon of Supreme Court
Jurisprudence?: A Critical Analysis, 57 OHIo ST. L.J. 1767, 1771-77 (1996) ("Three Flaws in the
Congressional Acquiescence Theory"). In contrast, in the zone of constitutional law, "[t]he doc-
trine of stare decisis . . . has only a limited application." Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 235
(1997) (quoting St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38, 94 (1936) (Stone and
Cardozo, JJ., concurring in result)). It is now widely accepted to distinguish between three in-
creasingly binding levels of stare decisis in different contexts: constitutional interpretation, com-
mon law rules, and statutory interpretation. See, e.g., Brian C. Kalt, Three Levels of Stare
Decisis: Distinguishing Common-Law, Constitutional, and Statutory Cases, 8 TEX. REV. L. &
POL. 277, 277-78 (2004).
13. See, e.g., Hohn v. United States, 524 U.S. 236, 251 (1998) ("The role of stare decisis, fur-
thermore, is 'somewhat reduced ... in the case of a procedural rule ... which does not serve as a
guide to lawful behavior."') (quoting United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 521 (1995)).
14. See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, The Supreme Court in Bondage: Constitutional Stare Decisis,
Legal Formalism, and the Future of Unenumerated Rights, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 155, 156 (2006)
("Whereas a three-judge panel of the United States Court of Appeal is bound to follow circuit
precedent and the lower federal courts are bound to follow the decisions of the United States
Supreme Court, the Supreme Court considers its own prior decisions as entitled to deference or
a presumption of correctness but not as binding."); Richard L. Rainey, Stare Decisis and Statu-
tory Interpretation: An Argument For A Complete Overruling of the National Parks Test, 61 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1430, 1461 (1993) ("The notion of statutory stare decisis, however, is somewhat
different in the context of the federal courts of appeals than in the Supreme Court.").
15. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992) (citing CARDOzo, supra
note 8, at 149).
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mary practical benefits of stare decisis include "stability,
predictability, and respect for judicial authority."' 6 In other words,
adhering to stare decisis treats similarly situated individuals in the
same way, fosters respect for the rule of law, and allows people to
transact with others in reliance on settled rules of engagement.17 In
light of these considerations, it may be sensible to adhere to stare de-
cisis even when a prior decision is later thought to have been wrongly
decided' 8 or would now be disfavored if decided anew by a court.19
Moreover, stare decisis has also been justified on the ground that
there is some form of "latent wisdom" or more correct substance in
rules that have been passed on and accepted by many previous gener-
ations and scholars. 20 Thus, as a jurisprudential rule, the Supreme
Court has repeatedly stated that it will generally not depart from stare
decisis absent compelling justifications.21
However, the Court has recognized both in Casey as well as in sub-
sequent decisions that stare decisis is not to be construed as an abso-
16. Hilton v. S.C. Pub. Rys. Comm'n, 502 U.S. 197, 202 (1991) (citing Vasquez v. Hillery, 474
U.S. 254, 265-66 n.9 (1986) ("[Stare decisis] permits society to presume that bedrock principles
are founded in the law rather than in the proclivities of individuals, and thereby contributes to
the integrity of our constitutional system of government, both in appearance and in fact.")); see
also CSX Transp., Inc. v. McBride, 131 S. Ct. 2630,2641 (2011); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida,
517 U.S. 44, 63 (1996) (noting that stare decisis promotes "'the evenhanded, predictable, and
consistent development of legal principles, . . . reliance on judicial decisions, and . . . the actual
and perceived integrity of the judicial process."') (quoting Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827,
(1991)); Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172 (1989).
17. See Freed, supra note 12, at 1767, 1767 n.3 (1996) (reviewing the justifications for stare
decisis including "certainty, equality, efficiency, and the appearance of justice").
18. See, e.g., Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 235 (1997) ("'[I]n most matters it is more impor-
tant that the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled right."') (quoting Burnet v.
Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)); Boys Mkts., Inc. v.
Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 258 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting) ("Having given
our view on the meaning of a statute, our task is concluded, absent extraordinary circumstances.
When the Court changes its mind years later, simply because the judges have changed, in my
judgment, it takes upon itself the function of the legislature.").
19. See, e.g., Radovich v. NFL, 352 U.S. 445, 452 (1957) (adhering to stare decisis despite
recognizing that had the same question been presented now "for the first time upon a clean
slate" the decision would surely be different); Vitro v. Mihelcic, 806 N.E.2d 632, 634-35 (Ill.
2004) ("This court also has recognized that it will not depart from precedent 'merely because the
court is of the opinion that it might decide otherwise were the question a new one."') (quoting
Illinois v. Robinson, 719 N.E.2d 662, 664 (Ill. 1999)).
20. See, e.g., Adrian Vermeule, Common Law Constitutionalism and the Limits of Reason, 107
COLUM. L. REV. 1482 (2007).
21. Hilton v. S.C. Pub. Rys. Comm'n, 502 U.S. 107, 202 (1991) (citing Arizona v. Rumsey, 467
U.S. 203, 212 (1984) ("[A]ny departure from the doctrine of stare decisis demands special justifi-
cation.")); see also Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 362 (2010) ("Our precedent is to be
respected unless the most convincing of reasons demonstrates that adherence to it puts us on a
course that is sure error.").
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lute command that the Court will always follow a prior rule.22 In
particular, the Court has held that stare decisis provides a balancing
test that weighs the expected costs and benefits of adhering to prior
precedent, taking into account whether: (1) the older holding has
proven practically unworkable; (2) there has been significant reliance
on the older holding; (3) new legal developments have rendered the
old law, in effect, no longer binding; and (4) factual advancement has
removed any justification the older holding had.23 More recently, the
Court has slightly reformulated the factors to be considered in evalu-
ating the strength of stare decisis to include: (1) how old the precedent
is; (2) the reliance interest at stake; (3) the reasonableness of the older
decision; and (4) whether experience has revealed a precedent's short-
comings.24 Although the Court has, on many occasions, laid out the
framework for deciding when stare decisis applies, this has not pre-
vented numerous commentators from opining that the true stare deci-
sis calculus is often unprincipled and rather mysterious. 25
Though stare decisis continues to hold its place in American juris-
prudence, the rule has never been free of detractors. Perhaps just as
famous as the notion of stare decisis itself is Judge Holmes' declara-
tion that "[i]t is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law
than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV."26 Indeed, over
a hundred and fifty years ago Alexis de Tocqueville criticized the com-
mon law tradition for its prioritizing reliance on decided cases over
22. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992) ("Even when the deci-
sion to overrule a prior case is not, as in the rare, latter instance, virtually foreordained, it is
common wisdom that the rule of stare decisis is not an inexorable command, and certainly it is
not such in every constitutional case.") (internal citations onitted); see also Pearson v. Callahan,
555 U.S. 223, 233 (2009) ("'[S]tare decisis is not an inexorable command."') (quoting State Oil
Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20 (1997)).
23. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 854-55.
24. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 362-63 ("'Beyond workability, the relevant factors in
deciding whether to adhere to the principle of stare decisis include the antiquity of the precedent,
the reliance interests at stake, and of course whether the decision was well reasoned."') (quoting
Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778, 792-93 (2009)); see also Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 348
(2009) (noting that although "stare decisis is of course 'essential to the respect accorded to the
judgments of the Court and to the stability of the law,"' it does not require following a "past
decision when its rationale no longer withstands 'careful analysis."') (quoting Lawrence v. Texas,
539 U.S. 558, 577 (2003)); see also Pearson, 555 U.S. at 233.
25. See, e.g., Trent B. Collier & Philip J. DeRosier, Understanding The Overrulings: A Re-
sponse To Robert Sedler, 56 WAYNE L. REV. 1761, 1767-70 (2010) (arguing that the Supreme
Court does not follow a clear or methodical approach in its application of stare decisis); Rafael
Gely, Of Sinking and Escalating: A (Somewhat) New Look At Stare Decisis, 60 U. Prrr. L. REV.
89, 94 (1998).
26. Oliver W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897).
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the "constituent principles of the law." 27 Moreover, contemporary
scholars have recognized that adherence to established legal decisions
may sometimes prevent a judge from pursuing his or her arguably
more basic function-to search for the truth in a matter-thus achiev-
ing efficiency only at the considerable expense of justice.28 In other
words, stare decisis can sometimes require that formalistic insistence
on established rules trumps a more equitable or mutually beneficial
decision in the matter before the court. Likewise, stare decisis may be
detrimental to the extent that it is antithetical to progress by, at times,
preserving oppressive traditions while preventing the law from keep-
ing up with contemporary notions of liberty and equality.29 More re-
cently, stare decisis has been further critiqued on the basis of
behavioral science notions that stare decisis reflects a cognitive bias in
favor of the status quo, thereby possibly stunting meaningful analy-
sis.30 While these arguments have hardly detracted from stare deci-
sis's prestigious standing in the legal community, this Article now
turns to the admittedly confused role that stare decisis plays in the
federal antitrust realm.
B. Stare Decisis's Diminished Role in Antitrust
In the wake of recent antitrust case law,3' scholars now take for
granted the fact that stare decisis plays a diminished role in the area of
antitrust.32 In particular, the Supreme Court has understood the Sher-
man Act to implement a common law approach whereby antitrust law
can adapt and change course as needed.33 Scholars thus assume that
27. See Goutam U. Jois, Stare Decisis Is Cognitive Error, 75 BROOK. L. REv. 63, 64 (2009)
("Tocqueville wrote that the greatest outrage to an Anglo-American lawyer was accusing him of
having an original thought.... The common law system and its reliance on precedent, he wrote,
forced lawyers to argue as though all of the rationale for their clients' position was compelled by
pre-existing case law.").
28. See Michael Serota, Stare Decisis and the Brady Doctrine, 5 HARv. L. & POL'Y REV. 415,
415 (2011) (noting that in some circumstances a "trial judge may be forced to navigate between
the Scylla of imperfect justice and the Charybdis of abrogating stare decisis").
29. See, e.g., Geoffrey R. Stone, Precedent, the Amendment Process, and Evolution in Consti-
tutional Doctrine, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 67 (1988) (describing stare decisis as an effort to
preserve all decisions "'made against common justice and the general reason of mankind"')
(quoting JONATHON Swwr, GULLIVER'S TRAVELS 275 (Novel Library ed. 1947)).
30. See Jois, supra note 27, at 81-92.
31. See infra Part II.C.
32. Salil K. Mehra, Paradise Is A Walled Garden? Trust, Antitrust, And User Dynamism, 18
GEO. MASON L. REv. 889, 920 (2011) ("[I]f recent Supreme Court decisions are any guide, stare
decisis appears to have waned compared to a quarter-century ago."); Picker, supra note 12, at
2-4 (reviewing the Supreme Court's approach to stare decisis in antitrust since the 1983 term).
33. See, e.g., State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 21 (1997) ("As we have explained, the term
'restraint of trade,' as used in § 1, also 'invokes the common law itself, and not merely the static
content that the common law had assigned to the term in 1890."') (quoting Bus. Elecs. Corp. v.
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stare decisis is simply not as big of an obstacle to change in the anti-
trust context as it is in other legal contexts. 34 For instance, it is under-
stood that antitrust precedent may not survive as long and that
antitrust legal tests may frequently change.35 Indeed, because of the
widespread belief that antitrust's legal doctrine can and will be over-
ruled and repealed as appropriate, scholars frequently attempt to pre-
dict which formerly binding rules of law will be abandoned next and
which, if any, have staying power.36
To be sure, the diminished function of stare decisis in antitrust is a
welcome development in the eyes of some. Those who subscribe to
this understanding primarily highlight the flexibility that results from a
weaker version stare decisis.37 Accordingly, antitrust law is thought to
Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 732 (1988); Frank H. Easterbrook, Workable Antitrust Policy,
84 MICH. L. REV. 1696, 1705 (1986) ("The Sherman Act set up a common law system in antitrust.
The statute and its legislative history authorize the ongoing transition on an efficiency-oriented
approach."); but see Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 736 (1977) ("In considering whether to
cut back or abandon the Hanover Shoe rule, we must bear in mind that considerations of stare
decisis weigh heavily in the area of statutory construction, where Congress is free to change this
Court's interpretation of its legislation."). This contradiction is further discussed below. See
infra Part III.C.
34. See, e.g., Alan J. Meese, Debunking the Purchaser Welfare Account of Section 2 of the
Sherman Act: How Harvard Brought Us A Total Welfare Standard and Why We Should Keep It,
85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 659, 716-17 (2010) ("Still, when it comes to antitrust, the normal principles of
stare decisis do not apply with full force. Over the past few decades in particular, the Supreme
Court has not hesitated to overrule its own antitrust decisions . . . "); Timothy B. Dyk, Does The
Supreme Court Still Matter?, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 763, 771 (2008) ("In the somewhat similar area
of antitrust, the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts beginning in the 1970s felt quite
free to change antitrust law without specific congressional authorization."); Alan Devlin, On The
Ramifications of Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc.: Are Tie-Ins Next?, 56
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 387, 400 (2008) (noting the "weakness of stare decisis in the antitrust field").
35. See Alan Devlin & Michael Jacobs, Antitrust Error, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 75, 98-99
(2010) ("Stare decisis exerts a relatively weak gravitational pull in the antitrust realm, in part
because the Sherman Act is a classic common law statute that leaves it to the judiciary to define
optimal competition policy. Bad precedents-and there have been many-have been reversed
left and right.").
36. See, e.g., Gregory J. Werden, Next Steps in the Evolution of Antitrust Law: What to Expect
from the Roberts Court, 5 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 49 (2009) (identifying (a) the absolute
requirement of market delineation as a predicate for merger analysis, (b) the approach to mar-
ket delineation of Brown Shoe, and (c) the formulation of the monopolization offense in Grin-
nell as three antitrust doctrines that are "ready for retirement"); Picker, supra note 12, at 1
(predicting that the Court will not directly abandon the per se rule against horizontal price fix-
ing); David S. Evans, Untying the Knot: The Case for Overruling Jefferson Parish 13 (July 2006),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/publiclhearings/single-firm/comments/219224a.pdf (advo-
cating for the overruling of Jefferson Parish); Devlin, supra note 34, at 391 (predicting and advo-
cating for the demise of the per se rule against product tying).
37. See, e.g., Ryan T. Jardine, Note, Economic Law-Vertical Minimum Pricing In Leegin-
Adrift With The Rule Of Reason; Sinking With Stare Decisis; Leegin Creative Leather Prod., Inc.
V. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705 (2007), 8 Wyo. L. REV. 683, 701 (2008) ("There are significant
benefits for flexibility in stare decisis for antitrust litigation.... By setting stare decisis aside the
Court will modernize and put to rest aged antitrust law and adapt to new economic understand-
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benefit from the Court's ability to more easily abandon precedent that
no longer fits with contemporary economic views and the Court's abil-
ity to keep the antitrust laws up-to-date with economic thinking. In
other words, this trend marks a triumph of economic reality over le-
galistic formality in the antitrust realm. Of course, one serious conse-
quence of a weaker version of stare decisis is that the antitrust
practitioner must also be an economist. 38 Thus stated, this view of
stare decisis would hardly surprise students of the Chicago School and
its understanding of antitrust law as nothing more than a branch of
applied microeconomics. 39
In contrast, a somewhat more dominant view of stare decisis takes a
negative attitude of such a state of affairs. As an initial matter, schol-
ars have criticized the predominance of economic theory over tradi-
tional legal reasoning in antitrust law due to a concern that judges
may lack the proper expertise to fully base their decision on economic
analysis. This concern goes beyond a judge's possible lack of formal
economic training, taking into account the institutional impediments
of a court in deciding economic matters and the lack of consensus
among economic scholars themselves on the costs and benefits of vari-
ous business practices. 40 Moreover, to the extent that the Court's an-
titrust decisions are in tension with stare decisis, the Court's tendency
to overrule antitrust precedent goes against the Court's function to
interpret law rather than promulgate policy. 41 The consequences of
ing which benefits consumers."); Barak D. Richman & Christopher R. Murray, Rebuilding Illi-
nois Brick: A Functionalist Approach to the Indirect Purchaser Rule, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 69, 81
(2007) ("As economic understanding and awareness of market conditions have improved, and as
alternative scenarios arise within different market conditions, courts have adapted antitrust law
to account for and adjust to the different applications. This trend has eliminated many per se
rules in favor of evaluative rules of reason, and has shifted away from adherence to legal cate-
gory and stare decisis and instead explicitly pursues functional objectives.").
38. See Jardine, supra note 37, at 701 ("It is therefore instructive to practitioners and busi-
nesses to realize that building upon stare decisis in antitrust litigation is building upon an unsta-
ble foundation. It is much more reliable to stay abreast of modern economic scholarship.").
39. See John E. Lopatka & William H. Page, Economic Authority and the Limits of Expertise
in Antitrust Cases, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 617, 620 (2005) ("Judge Richard Posner has gone so far
as to suggest that 'antitrust law has become a branch of applied economics."') (quoting RICH-
ARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY 229 (1999)).
40. See, e.g., Lance McMillian, The Proper Role of Courts: The Mistakes of the Supreme Court
in Leegin, 2008 Wis. L. REV. 405, 450-51 (2008) ("On the whole, economists dispute among
themselves the relative costs and benefits of resale-price maintenance as a device for the promo-
tion of consumer welfare... . The Court lacks the ability of the legislative branch to commission
a study to analyze the potential pluses and minuses of a given policy proposal in detail.").
41. See id. at 452-54 ("Stare decisis, by its very nature, connotes a respect for the past. Out of
this respect flows stability. . .. If the meaning of the Sherman Act can constantly change on the
basis of the composition of the Court, then it becomes a great reach for the Court to even
pretend that it is interpreting law.").
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failing to abide by stare decisis, especially in economic matters, in-
clude the following: the inability of businesspeople to confidently
transact under the assumption of settled law,4 2 diminished public con-
fidence in the Court,43 and a lack of fairness or evenhandedness in the
way justice is administered, which tends to undermine the concept of
the rule of law. 4 4 In other words, many of the benefits associated with
stare decisis may be lacking in antitrust law.
One final perspective that has gained traction in recent years is the
notion that weaker stare decisis in the field of antitrust flows-or
ought to flow-from the regulatory nature of the antitrust laws.4 5
Under this view, it is assumed that regulatory agencies, as opposed to
courts, tend to change the rules and doctrines they apply very quickly,
often reflecting shifting policies and priorities of incoming executive
administrations as well as the technical expertise of the agency in-
volved.46 Thus, if one assumes there is some carryover in the way that
42. See id. at 452-53 ("Part of law's function is to provide clear guidance so that citizens may
reasonably understand their rights and obligations. Constant change of the law would under-
mine this type of reliance. By guarding against frequent swings in a country's governing rules,
stare decisis protects an individual's expectations as a member of a broader society.").
43. See id. at 454-55 ("When this happens, raw political power, not a coherent antitrust juris-
prudence, controls the disposition of particular antitrust cases at the Supreme Court level. In the
long run, the Court's reputation suffers. Inconsistency invariably weakens public confidence in
the law and legal institutions.").
44. See Andrew S. Oldham, Sherman's March (In) To the Sea, 74 TENN. L. REV. 319, 379-80
(2007) (concluding that "the federal antitrust regime is unconstitutional. What began as a codifi-
cation of the common law in 1890 has mutated into a judge-made monstrosity that Senator Sher-
man and his fellow framers would not be able to recognize today. . . . [t]hus imperiling the
separation of powers doctrine and basic principles of federalism."); David F. Shores, Antitrust
Decisions and Legislative Intent, 66 Mo. L. REV. 725, 726 (2001) ("Dramatic change in the mean-
ing and effect of statutory law [in antitrust], without legislative action, is a development that
should arouse concern. Judicial conservatives, who view the proper function of courts as inter-
preting and applying the law, and eschew judicial lawmaking, should be especially concerned.");
Thomas C. Arthur, Farewell to the Sea of Doubt: Jettisoning the Constitutional Sherman Act, 74
CALIF. L. REV. 266, 268 (1986) ("In short, the norms that govern other areas of statutory law go
unobserved in antitrust, which imposes high costs on traditional rule-of-law values."); see also
Elbert L. Robertson, Does Antitrust Regulation Violate the Rule of Law?, 22 LoY. CONSUMER L.
REV. 108 (2009) (arguing that the vague and amorphous interpretations utilized under the Rule
of Reason violate the basic principles of the rule of law).
45. See, e.g., Daniel A. Crane, Technocracy and Antitrust, 86 TEX. L. REv. 1159, 1160 (2008)
(noting that "[s]ince the Chicago School revolution in the 1970s, federal antitrust enforcement
has become considerably less democratic and more technocratic. It has become increasingly
separated from popular politics, insulated from direct democratic pressures, delegated to indus-
trial-policy specialists, and compartmentalized as a regulatory discipline.").
46. See Mehra, supra note 32, at 920 (observing that "not only can the Court apply antitrust
doctrine, but the FTC can as well, where regulatory interpretations can and do change rapidly");
C. Scott Hemphill, An Aggregate Approach to Antitrust: Using New Data and Rulemaking to
Preserve Drug Competition, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 677 (2009) (noting that one advantage of
the FTC is that unlike the federal courts "it is less subject to the constraint of stare decisis"); but
see E. H. Schopler, Comment Note, Applicability of Stare Decisis Doctrine to Decisions of Ad-
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courts and the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice (DOJ)
and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) are involved in the inter-
pretation and enforcement of the antitrust laws, it may be somewhat
less surprising that stare decisis should play a less pronounced role. 4 7
In any event, for better or worse, stare decisis's diminished status in
antitrust appears to be beyond real debate. While it is difficult to
gather precise data on the relative frequency of cases being overruled
by the Supreme Court, many well-known antitrust doctrines have
been retired by the Court in the last five decades-at a time when the
Court rarely hears more than one or two antitrust cases per term4 8 -
suggesting a unique willingness to override stare decisis in this area.
Part II.C now turns to a sampling of cases that have overruled anti-
trust precedent and the justifications for these decisions.
C. Major Supreme Court Cases Overruling Precedents And Their
Internal Justifications
While the majority of antitrust cases spend most of their time in the
district courts and courts of appeal, the major antitrust doctrines ulti-
mately come-sooner or later-from the Supreme Court. While the
Supreme Court rarely addresses more than a single antitrust case per
term, and sometimes not even that, when it does select an antitrust
case for review, it is almost always to establish, modify, or repeal a
major antitrust doctrine. This Part focuses on the major Supreme
Court cases since the 1970s that have repealed important, and usually
longstanding, antitrust rules or doctrines. While this survey is not ex-
ministrative Agencies, 79 A.L.R.2d 1126 (2011) ("Notwithstanding statements made to the effect
that the doctrine of stare decisis does not, or does not fully, apply to decisions of administrative
agencies, the fact is that administrative agencies, in the exercise of their determinative functions,
follow, or, in an appropriate case, deviate from, their own precedents in a manner comparable to
what the courts do under the doctrine.").
47. While the FTC is an independent federal agency with commissioners and administrative
law judges, see 15 U.S.C. § 41 et seq., and the Antitrust Division is not, each entity employs both
lawyers and economists, and both entities are heavily involved in traditional enforcement as well
as the regulatory side of competition law. See, e.g., About the FTC, FEDERAL TRADE COMMIS-
SION, http://www.ftc.gov/ftc/about.shtm (last visited Jan. 2, 2014); About the Antitrust Division,
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/atr/about/mission.html (last visited Jan. 2,
2014).
48. See R. Hewitt Pate, Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Antitrust Div.,
Address at the British Institute of International and Comparative Law Conference: Antitrust
Law in the U.S. Supreme Court (May 11, 2004), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/
speeches/204136.htm ("Because there are so few Supreme Court antitrust decisions each year ...
each decision is an event of major significance for antitrust enforcers and the antitrust bar."). Of
note, the Court has taken somewhat more cases in recent years. See Thomas A. Lambert, The
Roberts Court and the Limits of Antitrust, 52 B.C. L. REV. 871, 872 n.2 (2011) (noting that "[t]he
Rehnquist Court decided one antitrust case from 1993 to 1995, one each year from 1996 through
1999, and none from 2000 to 2003; the Roberts Court decided seven cases from 2006 to 2007").
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haustive, it displays prime examples of the Court's willingness to over-
rule precedent in the name of developing competition policy, and it
includes the major justifications that the Court has given for this prac-
tice. The cases are presented chronologically in order to demonstrate
the erosion of stare decisis over four decades. For instance, this pro-
gression highlights the ascendency of neoclassical economic analysis in
antitrust law and the way in which the Court has relied on older cases
to justify repealing prior decisions despite stare decisis-itself a note-
worthy, though perhaps circular, version of stare decisis. To round out
the perspective presented here, this Part concludes with a discussion
of the most notable exception to the notion of a weakened version of
stare decisis: the Supreme Court's continuing commitment to Major
League Baseball's exemption from antitrust law in the face of im-
mense academic opposition.
1. Sylvania: The Demise of Per Se Illegality for Non-Price
Vertical Restrictions
In Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc.,49 the Court held that
non-price vertical restrictions, specifically geographic limitations im-
posed on retailers, were to be judged under the rule of reason rather
than be condemned per se. In that case, Continental, an electronics
retailer, sued Sylvania, a manufacturer, over its policies requiring re-
tailers to limit their sales of Sylvania products exclusively to specified
geographical zones.50 The Court concluded that Sylvania's conduct
had to be analyzed under the Rule of Reason and was not per se ille-
gal. In doing so, the Court expressly overruled United States v. Ar-
nold, Schwinn & Co.,51 which just ten years prior had announced that
non-price vertical restrictions were per se illegal so long as the trans-
action in question involved the passage of title.
The substantive reasons for overruling such a recent precedent are
found in Section III of the Sylvania opinion. While the Court did not
go through all the factors currently associated with stare decisis analy-
sis, the Court did mention stare decisis 52 and even devoted a few
paragraphs to justifying the sudden change in judicial course. First,
the Court acknowledged that Schwinn was a relatively recent case,
and, as such, it was not particularly entrenched precedent, which
49. Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
50. Id. at 38-40. Enforcement of the antitrust laws by private parties whom have been injured
by anticompetitive conduct is authorized by section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2006).
51. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
52. Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 47 ("Schwinn is supported by the principle of stare decisis.").
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weighed in favor of overruling.53 However, the Sylvania Court pro-
ceeded to explain that the main reason for overruling Schwinn was
based on an economic analysis. In doing so, the Sylvania Court cited
to articles and texts that identified the particular economic efficiencies
and "redeeming virtues" that may be inherent in a decision to impose
non-price vertical restraints. 54 The Court stressed that rules of per se
illegality are only appropriate where conduct has been shown, based
on past experience and familiarity, to be wholly pernicious and lack
any redeeming pro-competitive benefits.55 Thus, in light of the more
recently understood pro-competitive efficiencies that may be present
in non-price vertical restrictions, the Court found the per se ban to be
inappropriate.
In essence, the Sylvania Court's deviation from the normal rule of
stare decisis was purportedly justified based upon new or improved
economic understanding by the Court. The Court did not rely on
changed circumstances, markets, or economic realities but, rather, on
after-acquired economic comprehension. In other words, the Court
conceded that Schwinn was wrong at the time it was decided and all
that had changed was the majority of the Justices' understandings of
the economic underpinnings of non-price vertical restrictions. 56 With
the Court's subsequent realization-aided by contemporary legal and
economic scholars-the per se rule was understood to no longer be
appropriate. Moreover, to the extent that the Court did grapple with
the concept of stare decisis as a barrier to such a change in the law, it
noted briefly in a footnote that the "contracts in restraint of trade"
addressed by the Sherman Act are subject to contextual reevaluation
in like manner to the common law concept of restraints of trade.57
53. Id. Indeed, Schwinn itself was in disagreement with a case decided four years earlier,
refusing to endorse a per se rule against vertical restrictions. See White Motor Co. v. United
States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
54. Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 54-57. The Court understood such efficiencies to include: the poten-
tial inducement for retailers to a carry a manufacturer's product based on the promised local
intrabrand monopoly and an incentive for retailers to invest in advertising or other supplemental
services without the fear of local free riders. Id.
55. Id. at 49-50 (citing N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958)).
56. In this case, the new economic understanding wasn't actually new. This understanding is
featured prominently in Justice Stewart's dissent in Schwinn, 388 U.S. 365, 383-85 (1967), and in
some of the articles cited in Sylvania that were actually authored before Schwinn, for instance,
Lee E. Preston, Restrictive Distribution Arrangements: Economic Analysis and Public Policy
Standards, 30 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 506, 511 (1965) (identifying pro-competitive elements in
vertical restrictions), is cited in Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 55. This new economic understanding is
now accepted by a majority of the Supreme Court.
57. Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 53 n.21 ("We quite agree with Mr. Justice Stewart's dissenting com-
ment in Schwinn that 'the state of the common law 400 or even 100 years ago is irrelevant to the
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In the same vein, it is interesting to note the types of sources the
Sylvania Court relied upon to justify overruling the per se rule against
non-price vertical restraints. The citations in Section III of Sylvania
are mostly to prominent Chicago School advocates of economic analy-
sis in antitrust, such as Robert Bork and Richard Posner, as well as
citations to actual economic texts, such as Paul Samuelson's econom-
ics textbook.58 Such heavy reliance on economics-based sources im-
plies a different path from that of normal legal and doctrinal analysis.
Instead, the Court was concerned with making sure that the antitrust
laws were in sync with the justices' views on present economic theory.
2. Copperweld: The End of the Intra-Enterprise
Conspiracy Doctrine
In Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp.,59 the Supreme
Court held that, for the purposes of a Sherman Act section 1 conspir-
acy, a parent corporation and its wholly owned subsidiary were not
legally capable of conspiring with one another. Copperweld involved
a private antitrust competitor suit against a parent company, Cop-
perweld, and its wholly owned subsidiary, Regal Tubing. The com-
plaint alleged that Copperweld and Regal had conspired to illegally
prevent plaintiff Independence Tube from obtaining tubing jobs by
contacting plaintiff's potential business partners and banks to warn
them that plaintiff's business venture was operating in violation of cer-
tain contractual agreements. 60 The jury found that Copperweld and
Regal were distinct entities under the intra-enterprise conspiracy doc-
trine and that they had in fact engaged in a conspiracy in restraint of
trade in violation of section 1.61 The jury assessed damages for plain-
tiff accordingly. 62 The Seventh Circuit affirmed. 63
In reversing the lower court, the Supreme Court first acknowledged
that the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine-under which a parent
and a subsidiary could be found guilty of a conspiracy as long as they
acted as separate corporate entities-was supported by no fewer than
six prior Supreme Court decisions.64 The Copperweld Court found
issue before us: the effect of the antitrust laws upon vertical distributional restraints in the
American economy today.'") (quoting Schwinn, 388 U.S. at 392).
58. Id. at 55-57.
59. Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984).
60. Id. at 756-57.
61. Id. at 757-58.
62. Id. at 758.
63. Id.
64. Specifically, the Court recounted that the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine was sup-
ported, at least in dicta. United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218, 227-28 (1947) (concern-
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that in all of those cases, however, the language concerning the intra-
enterprise conspiracy doctrine was unnecessary to the decision.65
Thus, the Court was free to reach the conclusion that a parent com-
pany could not legally conspire with a wholly owned subsidiary in vio-
lation of section 1 of the Sherman Act without fully overruling and
disagreeing with the outcomes or merits of earlier cases. Nonetheless,
the Court recognized that it was, in effect, overruling prior cases to
the extent that they disagreed, and it was certainly establishing a doc-
trinal change by abandoning the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine.
This doctrine had, in fact, been the dominant rule of law for approxi-
mately four decades in both the Supreme Court as well as the courts
of appeal.66
In making this doctrinal change, the Court did not mention the rule
of stare decisis or even pay lip service to any benefit that might come
from continued adherence to the intra-enterprise conspiracy doc-
trine.67 However, the Court did spend time laying out policy and the-
matic arguments that supported overruling the intra-enterprise
conspiracy doctrine. In Copperweld, there was no focus on novel eco-
nomic understandings or on previously misunderstood statutory text.
Moreover, reliance was not heavily placed on economic material-
ing an antitrust enforcement action against a manufacturing company and multiple operating
companies all under single ownership and noting that unreasonable restraint "may result as
readily from a conspiracy among those who are affiliated or integrated under common owner-
ship as from a conspiracy among those who are otherwise independent"); Schine Chain Theatres,
Inc. v. United States, 334 U.S. 110, 116 (1948) (concerning an antitrust enforcement action in the
motion picture industry and holding that "[t]he concerted action of the parent company, its sub-
sidiaries, and the named officers and directors in that endeavor was a conspiracy which was not
immunized by reason of the fact that the members were closely affiliated rather than indepen-
dent"); United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 101 (1948) (concerning an antitrust enforcement
action against motion picture operators and finding a conspiracy between "four affiliated corpo-
rations and two individuals who are associated with them as stockholders and officers"); Kiefer-
Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211, 215 (1951) (involving a private
antitrust suit against two wholly owned subsidiaries of a liquor distillers and holding that "com-
mon ownership and control does not liberate corporations from the impact of the antitrust
laws"); Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, 598 (1951) (concerning an
antitrust enforcement action against an American corporation and its British and French affili-
ates and holding that "common ownership or control of the contracting corporations does not
liberate them from the impact of the antitrust laws"); Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. Int'l Parts
Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 141-42 (1968) (concerning a private antitrust suit against a parent corpora-
tion and three subsidiaries and holding that the "fact of common ownership could not save [the
defendants] from any of the obligations that the law imposes on separate entities").
65. Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 760-66 (1984).
66. Id. at 777 ("To the extent that prior decisions of this Court are to the contrary, they are
disapproved and overruled.").
67. Indeed, only the dissent mentioned stare decisis and engaged in a forthright discussion
about the limited circumstances that justify overruling precedent. See id. at 779-84 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
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only a bare minimum was even cited-and the Court did not grapple
very much with statutory language or history.68 Instead, the dominant
thrust of the Court's opinion focused on policy and the overarching
principles of the Sherman Act. The Court placed great weight on the
fact that parents and subsidiaries have a unity of purpose and main-
tain joint resources and goals.69 The Court compared this unity to the
unity of two corporate officers who might make a decision together-
a situation in which no one would believe that a conspiracy in restraint
of trade was afoot.70 To the extent that economic concerns weighed
upon the Court, it acknowledged that such internal coordination pro-
motes effective management within an enterprise. Moreover, the stat-
utory text itself only played a role in the Court's determination
inasmuch as the Court bolstered its conclusion with the Sherman
Act's central distinction between unilateral and concerted action.7'
Specifically, because the statute is so careful to distinguish between
unilateral and coordinated action, and to limit sanctions on cases of
unilateral action to those involving actual or threatened monopoliza-
tion, the statute could not have meant to make almost all decisions
involving two people or entities eligible for conspiracy. Finally, the
Court noted that to allow liability for wholly owned subsidiaries but
not for mere internal sub-divisions of a company would lead to a for-
mal substanceless distinction within antitrust law. 72
In sum, the Copperweld Court justified its departure from past anti-
trust doctrine as a way of keeping a tab on and fine-tuning underlying
antitrust policy in accordance with the spirit of the antitrust laws. The
Court believed that the older doctrine-intra-enterprise conspiracy-
needed to be reevaluated in light of commercial realities, and Cop-
perweld presented the opportunity to do so. In other words, the Court
was engaged in doctrinal analysis and refinement, or the project of
developing the law as it expands, to handle ever new situations, such
as the greater complexity of corporate structure.
68. In fact, the Court suggests that the language of the statute is totally ambiguous, and the
plain language of a "conspiracy" might in fact be understood to include any two economic actors
at all, even members of a single integrated enterprise. See id. at 769 n.15.
69. Id. at 771-72.
70. Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 769.
71. Id. at 768-69 ("The distinction between unilateral and concerted conduct is necessary for a
proper understanding of the terms 'contract, combination . . . or conspiracy' in § 1.").
72. Id. at 772-74 (noting that "[realities] must dominate the judgment") (quoting Appalachian
Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 360 (1933)).
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3. ARCO: The Introduction of Antitrust Injury
Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co. (ARCO)73 built upon a
line of Supreme Court cases introducing and developing the require-
ment of "antitrust injury" in private antitrust suits. 7 4 ARCO involved
a suit against ARCO by a competitor, USA Petroleum, alleging illegal
vertical maximum price maintenance.75 At the time, vertical maxi-
mum price maintenance was illegal per se.76 However, although
ARCO had engaged in prohibited anticompetitive conduct, the Court
held that USA Petroleum, as a competitor rather than a customer or a
link in ARCO's chain of distribution, was not injured by the compo-
nent of ARCO's behavior that made that behavior anticompetitive.77
In fact, USA Petroleum might theoretically have been helped by
ARCO's policy of setting maximum resale prices.78 In other words,
the Court limited the zone of potential antitrust plaintiffs to those who
are harmed because of dampened competition in a market, at times
apparently excluding a competitor from suing based on anticompeti-
tive conduct.79
In expanding the notion of antitrust injury to preclude suit by a
competitor-even a suit involving per se illegal conduct-absent a
larger injury to competition itself, the Court implicitly overruled, or at
least significantly curtailed, the holdings of prior cases permitting
competitor suits without immediate proof of harm to the overall com-
petitive process. Most notably, in Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples
Gas Light & Coke Co.80 and Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores,
Inc.,81 the Supreme Court refused to dismiss competitor suits alleging
that the plaintiffs had been forced out of their respective markets by a
standard setting trade organization in Radiant Burners and by a com-
73. Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co. (ARCO), 495 U.S. 328 (1990).
74. The birth of the concept of antitrust injury is generally associated with Brunswick Corp. v.
Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977), and further developed in Cargill, Inc. v.
Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104 (1986); see generally Jonathan M. Jacobson & Tracy Greer,
Twenty-One Years Of Antitrust Injury: Down The Alley With Brunswick v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat,
66 ANTITRUST L.J. 273 (1998) (discussing the history of the antitrust injury requirement).
75. ARCO, 495 U.S. at 331.
76. See Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968). Albrecht was later overruled. See infra
Part III.C.
77. ARCO, 495 U.S. at 345.
78. Id. at 336-37 ("Respondent was benefited rather than harmed if petitioner's pricing poli-
cies restricted ARCO sales to a few large dealers or prevented petitioner's dealers from offering
services desired by consumers such as credit card sales.") (emphasis added).
79. Id. at 337-39 ("The antitrust laws were enacted for 'the protection of competition, not
competitors."') (quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962)) (emphasis
in original).
80. Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656 (1961).
81. Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
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petitor's agreement with suppliers in Klor's. In these earlier cases, the
Court had held that anticompetitive harm to a competitor alone was
enough to justify a private antitrust suit.82 In fact, in Klor's, the Court
explicitly rejected the defendant's argument and the Ninth Circuit's
conclusion that "a violation of the Sherman Act requires conduct of
defendants by which the public is or conceivably may be ultimately
injured."83 Thus, while the ARCO Court-as well as the prior anti-
trust injury cases-did not so much as mention its impact on the ear-
lier case law, it put substantial restrictions on future competitor
suits. 84
Because the ARCO Court did not see itself as overruling prior
precedents, the Court never addressed the issue of stare decisis and its
applicability or lack thereof. Nonetheless, the Court provided specific
reasoning as to why competitor harm alone would no longer state an
antitrust cause of action. In contrast to Sylvania, the ARCO Court did
not rely on particularized economic models or theoretical advances.
Instead, the Court's focus was doctrinal. The Court concentrated on
sharpening the element of proper enforcement within antitrust,
82. See, e.g., Radiant Burners, 364 U.S. at 660 (stating that anticompetitive conduct is "'not to
be tolerated merely because the victim is just one [manufacturer] whose business is so small that
his destruction makes little difference to the economy."') (quoting Klor's, 359 U.S. at 213). Of
further interest, in addition to Klor's and Radiant Burner's holdings concerning proper plaintiff
antitrust standing, it appears that more recent Supreme Court precedent has eroded Klor's and
Radiant Burner's other significant holdings concerning concerted refusals to deal. In Radiant
Burners and Klor's, as well as numerous earlier cases, there was no question that a concerted
refusal to deal was per se illegal. See, e.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S.
150, 210-20 (1940); Fashion Originators' Guild, Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941); N. Pac. Ry. Co.
v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958); Klor's, 359 U.S. at 207 (1959); Radiant Burners, 364 U.S. at
656 (1961). The entire premise of the per se rule of illegality, of course, is that conduct-here a
concerted refusal to deal-is prohibited without inquiring into the specific pro-competitive justi-
fications that may be put forth in a particular case. Since then, however, the Supreme Court
held in Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284,
294 (1985), that the per se rule concerning concerted refusals to deal has only been applied to
cases that coercively cut parties out of business relationship, denied parties access to crucial
business needs and "were generally not justified by plausible arguments that they were intended
to enhance overall efficiency and make markets more competitive." Id. In other words, after
Northwestern Wholesale, the per se rule may not apply to group boycotts when plausible pro-
competitive justifications can be offered. Thus, while Northwestern Wholesale merely purports
to define that group boycotts are per se illegal, its reasoning can-in an analogous manner to
ARCO-be construed to have effectively undermined a crucial portion of the holding of Radiant
Burners. For instance, at least one court has noted that "[t]he apparent rule [after Northwestern
Wholesale] is that concerted refusals to deal are violations per se of § 1 where there is no plausi-
ble argument that the refusal to deal accentuates efficiency . . . ." Tacker v. Wilson, 830 F. Supp.
422, 427 (W.D. Tenn. 1993).
83. Klor's, 359 U.S. at 210 (quoting Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 255 F.2d 214,
233 (1958)).
84. See, e.g., Jacobson & Greer, supra note 74, at 273 ("ARCO's reasoning and result made it
very clear that Radiant Burners had been overruled.").
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namely ensuring that antitrust law focused on the integrity of the com-
petitive process and not the viability of individual competitors. This
concern manifests itself in the Court's rule, limiting the scope of
proper antitrust plaintiffs, and is visible in many portions of the opin-
ion. First, the Court placed the primary emphasis of its reasoning on
parsing out the harms inherent in vertical maximum price mainte-
nance and establishing that those particular harms did not apply to a
competitor like USA Petroleum.85 Second, the Court devoted Section
II.C of its opinion to explaining that it was appropriate to dismiss
USA Petroleum's suit inasmuch as there were other, more proper par-
ties out there with the incentive to complain about the alleged an-
ticompetitive conduct. 86 Furthermore, the Court situated its decision
within a line of gradually developing case law, bringing antitrust doc-
trine into line with the principles underlying the Sherman Act-pro-
tecting the competitive process. These decisions developed over more
than two decades with an emphasis on underlying legal objectives
rather than on updated economic theory.87 Taken together, these ele-
ments of the opinion suggest that the primary justification of the
ARCO Court's application of the antitrust injury rule-even in the
context of a per se violation-was its concern with ensuring that the
antitrust laws coherently advanced the protection of the competitive
process. The Court did this by limiting private enforcement of anti-
trust laws to cases that represented real competitive harm. In other
words, the Court repealed, or at least restricted, prior holdings in the
name of further doctrinal refinement by chipping away at legal ele-
ments that detracted from the goals of protecting competition.
4. State Oil: Rejecting Per Se Illegality for Maximum Resale
Price Maintenance
In State Oil Co. v. Khan,88 the Supreme Court finally began to ex-
plicitly play down the role of stare decisis in the realm of antitrust.
State Oil involved a private antitrust suit by the lessee and operator of
a gasoline station against the defendant, State Oil, the owner of the
station. The complaint was based on State Oil's practice of controlling
the prices that plaintiff could charge for gas, in effect imposing a maxi-
85. ARCO, 495 U.S. 328, 334-41 (1990).
86. Id. at 345-46.
87. The ARCO Court did, in fact, cite to articles by many scholars affiliated with the Chicago
School's notions of law and economics, such as Robert Bork and Frank Easterbrook. However,
the primary emphasis, especially at the beginning of Section II and II.A where the Court justifies
the application of the antitrust injury rule, was on the general goal of protecting competition and
bringing this case in line with prior decisions.
88. State Oil, Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997).
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mum resale price maintenance scheme on the plaintiff. Thus, the case
came squarely under the Supreme Court's ruling twenty-nine years
earlier in Albrecht v. Herald Co., 8 9 which had held that maximum re-
sale price maintenance was per se illegal. The question before the
Court, therefore, was whether or not Albrecht should be overruled.
Ultimately, the State Oil Court unanimously overruled Albrecht,
thereby returning cases involving maximum resale price maintenance
to the rule of reason framework. 90 In sum and substance, though, the
Court's justification for breaking with stare decisis is based on its im-
proved understanding of economic analysis-the pro-competitive ben-
efits of maximum resale price maintenance. This perspective is
discernable in all three stages of the Court's justification for its depar-
ture from the rule stare decisis: (1) the erosion of Albrecht, (2) the
explicit reliance on economic reasoning, and (3) the notion that the
Sherman Act gives the Court common law powers when adjudicating
antitrust matters.
First, the Court. provided formal justification for its decision to
overrule a nearly three-decade precedent based on the fact that Al-
brecht had already been heavily undermined by Supreme Court deci-
sions since it was originally decided. 91 In particular, the Court relied
heavily on the fact that Albrecht relied greatly on Schwinn's holding,
which imposed per se illegality on non-price vertical restrictions, and
Schwinn itself was overruled by Sylvania.92 The Court also empha-
sized the fact that cases prior, but very close, to Albrecht had refused
to adopt a per se rule93 and that cases after Albrecht had generally
subjected vertical restrictions to less scrutiny than horizontal restric-
tions.94 Therefore, the Court believed that, because Albrecht had al-
ready been so weakened, overruling it was not, in fact, a full break
with stare decisis. This entire erosion of Albrecht, however, was built
upon economic theory. For instance, the State Oil Court noted that its
overruling of Schwinn was heavily based on a review of "scholarly
works supporting the economic utility of vertical nonprice re-
straints." 95 Likewise, the State Oil Court believed that its decision in
89. Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968).
90. State Oil, 522 U.S. at 21-22.
91. Id. at 10 ("A review of this Court's decisions leading up to and beyond Albrecht is relevant
to our assessment of the continuing validity of the per se rule established in Albrecht.").
92. See supra Part II.C.1.
93. State Oil, 522 U.S. at 11-12 (citing White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963)
(noting its refusal to impose a per se rule in White Motor only five years before Albrecht).
94. Id. at 14 (citing Arizona v. Maricopa Cnty. Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, (1982) (noting that
"vertical restraints are generally more defensible than horizontal restraints").
95. Id. at 13 (restating the economic basis in Sylvania for overruling Schwinn).
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ARCO further displayed the erosion of Albrecht based on the recogni-
tion "that vertical maximum price fixing may have procompetitive in-
terbrand effects, and . . . [that] the procompetitive potential of a
vertical maximum price restraint is more evident . . . than it was
when Albrecht was decided." 96 In other words, the very reason that
Albrecht's per se rule against maximum resale price maintenance had
eroded was because the Court had embraced a new or better under-
standing of the economic pro-competitive effects of the practice.
Thus, heightened economic awareness justified a departure from stare
decisis.
Second, the Court justified its decision to overrule Albrecht on the
basis of economic reasoning.97 In particular, section II.B of the
Court's decision details the ways in which the practice of maximum
resale price maintenance has potential pro-competitive impacts and
the ways in which the per se rule against it may even harm consum-
ers.98 Moreover, the discussion contains citations to prominent Chi-
cago school advocates, urging that economic analysis play a serious
role in antitrust analysis. 99
Finally, in overruling Albrecht, the Court invoked the idea that the
Sherman Act is a common law statute that gives the Court power to
develop antitrust law in a flexible and dynamic fashion.10 While this
idea has roots in earlier case law, 01 State Oil used this mantra to over-
rule precedent that was no longer in line with contemporary economic
paradigms, thereby disallowing the usual, gradual development that is
96. Id. at 14-15 (further noting ARCO's citation to "several commentators identifying
procompetitive effects of vertical maximum price fixing") (internal quotations and citations
omitted).
97. Id. at 15 ("Thus, our reconsideration of Albrecht's continuing validity is informed by sev-
eral of our decisions, as well as a considerable body of scholarship discussing the effects of verti-
cal restraints.").
98. State Oil, 522 U.S. at 18 ("Not only are the potential injuries cited in Albrecht less serious
than the Court imagined, the per se rule established therein could in fact exacerbate problems
related to the unrestrained exercise of market power by monopolist-dealers.").
99. For instance, the Court cites to the work of Robert Bork, id. at 16, Frank Easterbrook, id.
at 17, and Richard Posner, id. at 20.
100. Id. at 21 ("As we have explained, the term 'restraint of trade,' as used in § 1, also 'in-
vokes the common law itself, and not merely the static content that the common law had as-
signed to the term in 1890."') (quoting Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 732
(1988).
101. See, e.g., Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 406, (1911)
("With respect to contracts in restraint of trade, the earlier doctrine of the common law has been
substantially modified in adaptation to modern conditions."); Gibbs v. Consol. Gas Co., 130 U.S.
396, 409 (1889) (observing that older English cases concerning "the foundation of the rule in
relation to the invalidity of contracts in restraint of trade . . . [were] made under a condition of
things, and a state of society, different from those which now prevail, [however] the rule laid
down is not regarded as inflexible, and has been considerably modified").
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often associated with the common law. Specifically, the Court did not
find, for example, that the per se rule against resale price maintenance
was no longer justified because price maintenance was now employed
in new commercial contexts or served newer business needs. Rather,
the Court found that, based on enhanced economic understanding, the
per se rule was never the correct economic approach to resale price
maintenance from the day Albrecht was decided.102 Therefore, the in-
correctness of Albrecht, combined with the common law nature of the
Sherman Act, justified a departure from stare decisis.
In sum, similar to the Court's approach in Sylvania-and at least
partially based on it-the State Oil decision rejected an established
legal precedent on the grounds of better economic understanding and
newer notions of pro-competitive benefits. Also, as in Sylvania, the
Court invoked the common law nature of the Sherman Act to justify
relying on the newer economic models. While the State Oil Court did
engage in some formal legal analysis of the extent to which Albrecht
had been gradually eroded, the goal of that analysis was only to show
that older rules concerning resale price maintenance were out of line
with newer economic understandings concerning the empirical bene-
fits associated with that practice.
5. Illinois Tool Works: Patents No Longer Create a
Presumption of Market Power
In Illinois Tool Works, Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc.,10 3 the Court
dealt with the question of whether a patent confers market power for
antitrust purposes on the patent holder.1" Illinois Tool involved a
private antitrust claim against a printing systems manufacturer, alleg-
ing that the defendant used its monopoly power in the tying product-
patented printing mechanisms and ink containers-to force others to
buy defendant's unpatented ink-the tied product.10 5 However, the
plaintiff did not put forth evidence of defendant's market power in the
102. State Oil, 522 U.S. at 21 ("Albrecht has been widely criticized since its inception. With
the views underlying Albrecht eroded by this Court's precedent, there is not much of that deci-
sion to salvage.").
103. Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v. Indep., Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006).
104. Market power is an essential ingredient in certain antitrust claims, such as tying and
section 2 monopolization claims. See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2,
13-14 (1984) ("Accordingly, we have condemned tying arrangements when the seller has some
special ability-usually called 'market power'-to force a purchaser to do something that he
would not do in a competitive market."); United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71
(1966) ("The offense of monopoly under [section] 2 of the Sherman Act has two elements: (1)
the possession of monopoly power in the relevant market and (2) the willful acquisition or main-
tenance of that power.").
105. Ill. Tool, 547 U.S. at 31-32.
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tying market other than to show that the defendant had valid patents
on those tying products. The Court noted that, while tying arrange-
ments used to be subject to per se condemnation in virtually all
cases,106 tying was only illegal per se if market power in the tying
product was established.107 In terms of the requirement of establish-
ing market power, however, the Court acknowledged that at least six
prior Supreme Court cases had held that a showing of a defendant's
patent on a tying product was alone sufficient to establish market
power in that market.108 Thus, under these established antitrust
precedents, plaintiffs would have put forth enough evidence to state a
claim of unlawful tying.
In Illinois Tool, however, the Court-again unanimously-reversed
course and held that patents would no longer be sufficient to show
that a defendant possessed market power in the context of an alleged
tying scheme. 109 In setting aside the older case law, the Court did not
address the impediment of stare decisis by name nor did it pay any
106. Id. at 35 ("Our early opinions consistently assumed that '[t]ying arrangements serve
hardly any purpose beyond the suppression of competition"') (quoting Standard Oil Co. of Cal.
v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 305-06 (1949)).
107. Id. at 36-38. As noted earlier, in light of the trend toward decreased scrutiny of tying
arrangements in Illinois Tool as well as Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Jefferson Parish, it is
unclear how much longer tying arrangements will be treated as per se violations under any cir-
cumstances. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
108. Earlier Supreme Court cases clearly set out this rule, either in their holdings or in dicta.
See Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 16 ("[I]f the government has granted the seller a patent or
similar monopoly over a product, it is fair to presume that the inability to buy the product else-
where gives the seller market power."); United States v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 45 n.4 (1962)
("This is even more obviously true when the tying product is patented or copyrighted, in which
case, as appears in greater detail below, sufficiency of economic power is presumed."); Times-
Picayune Pub. Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 608 (1953) ("The patents on their face con-
ferred monopolistic, albeit lawful, market control, and the volume of salt affected by the tying
practice was not 'insignificant or insubstantial."') (internal citations omitted); Standard Oil Co.
of Cal. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 304 (1949) ("[International Salt], at least as to contracts
tying the sale of a nonpatented to a patented product, rejected the necessity of demonstrating
economic consequences once it has been established that 'the volume of business affected' is not
'insignificant or insubstantial' and that the effect of the contracts is to 'foreclose competitors
from [a] substantial market."') (quoting Int'l Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 396 (1947);
Int'l Salt Co., 332 U.S. at 395-96 (finding an illegal tying arrangement under the Sherman and
Clayton Acts without any finding of market power other than defendant's patent in the tying
product); Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 491-92 (1942) (holding that using
sales of a patented device to force a purchaser to buy unpatented parts is unconditionally prohib-
ited as an illicit extension of a lawful monopoly).
109. Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v. Indep., Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 46 (2006) (holding "that, in all cases
involving a tying arrangement, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant has market power in
the tying product" independent of the existence of a legitimate patent). In fact, the Court went
so far as to deny that there was even "a rebuttable presumption that patentees possess market
power when they condition the purchase of the patented product on an agreement to buy unpat-
ented goods exclusively from the patentee." Id. at 43.
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attention to factors that might support consistency in the application
of legal rules. That said, the Court did squarely address and acknowl-
edge the substantive concerns and justifications that warranted abro-
gating the older cases that treated patents as absolute evidence of
market power. 110 Specifically, the Court relied on an interesting mix
of rationales to support its holding, including both a dose of doctrinal
refinement as well as the notion that the opinions of the FT C and the
DOJ should play a role in competition policy. Still, though, the pri-
mary ground for the new rule seemed to find support in economic
justification: the newly understood potential pro-competitive benefits
of tying arrangements.
On the one hand, the initial thrust of the Court's analysis focuses on
the historical fact that the notion that patents grant some sort of auto-
matic market power derives from the patent misuse doctrine, rather
than from antitrust law.111 It was only decades later in International
Salt that the Court allowed that presumption to be used offensively
for the purpose of showing an antitrust violation.112 However, the Illi-
nois Tool Court observed that Congress had recently eliminated the
"patent-equals-market-power presumption" with the enactment of its
1988 amendments to the Patent Code. 113 In other words, under the
110. Id. at 40 (noting that the Court was prepared to engage in a "reexamination of the pre-
sumption of per se illegality of a tying arrangement involving a patented product").
111. The origins of the patent misuse doctrine are attributed to Motion Picture Patents Co. v.
Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917) (overruling Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1
(1912), which had earlier approved of the practice). The Motion Picture case involved a patent
infringement suit by a manufacturer of patented motion picture machinery that was using the
leases of such patented equipment to force purchasers or lessees to also buy unpatented film.
Thus, the doctrine was originally a defense to a patent infringement claim whereby a defendant
could avoid allegations of infringement by showing that the patent-holder had abused its patent
by using the patent to force purchasers or lessees to exclusively use unpatented materials made
by the plaintiff. See, e.g., Morton Salt Co., 314 U.S. at 490 (framing the question before the
Court as "whether a court of equity will lend its aid to protect the patent monopoly when re-
spondent is using [the patent] as the effective means of restraining competition with its sale of an
unpatented article").
112. Int'l Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947) (holding that leases of patented ma-
chines requiring the lessees to use the defendant's unpatented salt products violated section 1 of
the Sherman Act and section 3 of the Clayton Act); see also United States v. Columbia Steel Co.,
334 U.S. 495, 522-23 (1948) ("For example, where a complaint charges that the defendants have
... licensed a patented device on condition that unpatented materials be employed in conjunc-
tion with the patented device, then the amount of commerce involved is immaterial because such
restraints are illegal per se.").
113. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(5) (1988) ("No patent owner otherwise entitled to relief for in-
fringement or contributory infringement of a patent shall be denied relief or deemed guilty of
misuse or illegal extension of the patent right by reason of his having done one or more of the
following: . . . (5) conditioned the license of any rights to the patent or the sale of the patented
product on the acquisition of a license to rights in another patent or purchase of a separate
product, unless, in view of the circumstances, the patent owner has market power in the relevant
market for the patent or patented product on which the license or sale is conditioned.")
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amended Patent Code, patent misuse was a valid defense to infringe-
ment only when market power was actually shown. Thus, the Court
believed that it would be a mistake not to continue to keep the status
of a patent vis-A-vis market power symmetrical under both patent mis-
use and the antitrust laws.114 Under this line of reasoning, the Court
was essentially engaged in a form of doctrinal refinement by ensuring
symmetry in the law and ensuring that concepts do not spill over from
one area of law to another in a way that goes beyond the scope of the
law's original intent.
The Court also briefly noted that it found the views of the federal
antitrust bodies persuasive on the patent question. In 1947, the gov-
ernment had urged the Court in International Salt to treat tying ar-
rangements involving patented products as per se illegal."15 However,
the Court noted that by 1995-well before Illinois Tool was pend-
ing-both the FTC and the DOJ had publically taken the position that
they would "not presume that a patent, copyright, or trade secret nec-
essarily confers market power upon its owner."11 6 Though the Court
noted that this was in no way binding, it was a decisive factor in the
Court's decision." 7 From this perspective, one might understand that
the Court was giving deference to the role that the antitrust bodies
play in the federal antitrust system. In other words, the fact that the
Sherman Act,"i8 Clayton Act," 9 and FTC Act 20 are partially policed
by the DOJ and FTC-both thought to possess an expertise on com-
petition law-constitutes a valid reason for the Court to be somewhat
more flexible in antitrust law and override stare decisis in light of
changing regulatory approaches.
However, the dominant theme in the Court's justification for over-
ruling the patent-confers-market-power doctrine was altered eco-
nomic understanding. First, the Court explicitly mentioned the fact
that current economic thinking advocates against the automatic con-
ferral of market power.121 Moreover, the Court relied on additional
114. Ill. Tool, 547 U.S. at 42 ("[G]iven the fact that the patent misuse doctrine provided the
basis for the market power presumption, it would be anomalous to preserve the presumption in
antitrust after Congress has eliminated its foundation.").
115. Id. at 39 (citing the Brief for the United States in Int'l Salt Co., 332 U.S. at 392 (No. 46)).
116. Id. at 45 (quoting U.S. Dept. of Justice and FTC, Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing
of Intellectual Property § 2.2 (Apr. 6, 1995), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guide-
lines/0558.pdf).
117. Id.
118. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
119. 15 U.S.C. § 12 (2006).
120. 15 U.S.C. § 41 (2006).
121. Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 43 n.4 (2006) (collecting sources and
noting that the "vast majority of academic literature" supports the Court's holding). Indeed,
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academic literature to support its new economic understanding that
"tying arrangements, even those involving patents and requirements
ties, are fully consistent with a free, competitive market."122 The
Court did not delve into an in-depth analysis of the pro-competitive
advantages and the ways that tying can co-exist with competitive mar-
kets as it did in, for instance, Sylvania. However, the Court's opinion
explicitly noted that it was influenced by recent economic advance-
ments related to the topic.12 3 Furthermore, the other two changes
that the Court pointed to-the curtailment of the patent misuse doc-
trine and the policy changes of the DOJ and FTC-were themselves
based on developing economic understandings. In curtailing the pat-
ent misuse doctrine, the legislative history leading up to the eventual
passage of patent misuse reform confirms Congress's concern that the
broadness of the doctrine had made it unsound based on current eco-
nomic understanding.124 Likewise the FTC and DOJ guideline cited
by the Court was based on the understanding that there will often be
close substitutes for the patented products in question.125 In sum, the
Illinois Tool Court was mostly convinced by heightened economic un-
derstanding that the existence of a patent simply did not confer mar-
ket power and that there might be genuine pro-competitive benefits to
forms of bundling that include patented products. In this case,
though, the economic justifications for departing from stare decisis
were buttressed by arguments that found support in the development
of the patent misuse doctrine and were publically supported by the
DOJ and FTC.
earlier cases that questioned the soundness of the patent misuse doctrine were also clearly based
on economic grounds. See, e.g., USM Corp. v. SPS Techs., Inc., 694 F.2d 505, 510-11 (7th Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1107 (1983) (questioning whether there really is any economic ad-
vantage to the practices that had been labeled as patent misuse).
122. Ill. Tool, 547 U.S. at 45.
123. Id. at 33 ("Our review is informed by extensive scholarly comment and a change in posi-
tion by the administrative agencies charged with enforcement of the antitrust laws.').
124. See S. REP No. 100-83, 1987 WL 967478 (1987) ("[T]he patent misuse doctrine has been
applied in a manner inconsistent with sound economic principles.. . . And recent law review
commentary has condemned certain applications of the misuse doctrine as inherently anticompe-
titive. . . . [Tihe doctrine's potential for impeding pro-competitive arrangements, are major
causes for concern."). The same legislative history also makes clear that the DOJ greatly sup-
ported the efforts to amend the patent misuse doctrine in 1987.
125. See U.S. Dept. of Justice and FTC, Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual
Property § 2.2 (Apr. 6, 1995), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0558.pdf.
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6. Leegin: Abolishing Per Se Illegality in Resale
Price Maintenance
Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc.,126 addressed
the question, left open after State Oil, of whether minimum resale
price maintenance should remain illegal per se. Leegin involved a suit
by a retailer of women's apparel against Leegin, a manufacturer of
leather goods and accessories. Leegin refused to sell to plaintiff after
plaintiff was found to be selling Leegin's products at discounts from
the manufacturer's suggested price. 27 Plaintiff brought suit, alleging
that Leegin's policy constituted minimum resale price maintenance
and was illegal per se.128 Minimum resale price maintenance had been
illegal per se since the Supreme Court's famous 1911 decision in Dr.
Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co.12 9 On the strength of
Dr. Miles, plaintiff prevailed in the lower court, and the Fifth Circuit
affirmed.130 Finally, the case forced the Supreme Court to confront a
precedent with ninety-six years of standing, evoking an extended dia-
logue on stare decisis in both the majority and an impassioned dissent.
The majority in Leegin justified its decision to overrule such
weighty precedent on contemporary economic understandings. In
many places, the Court explicitly relied on current economic analysis
in finding that Dr. Miles inappropriately condemned minimum resale
price maintenance.'13 Likewise, the Court cited a great deal of aca-
demic economic literature as a foundation for its conclusion concern-
ing resale price maintenance.132 Specifically, the Court listed the pro-
competitive effects that are now understood to be potentially associ-
ated with minimum resale price maintenance, including enhanced re-
tailers' investment and consumer choice.133 In light of this
understanding, the Court concluded that a per se ban-reserved for
126. Leegin Creative Leather Prods. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007).
127. Id. at 882-85.
128. Id.
129. Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
130. Leegin, 551 U.S. at 884.
131. See, e.g., id. at 889 ("[I]t is necessary to examine, in the first instance, the economic effects
of vertical agreements to fix minimum resale prices and to determine whether the per se rule is
nonetheless appropriate.") (emphasis added).
132. See, e.g., id. at 889-90 (noting prominent economic sources as well as amicus curiae briefs
in the case based on contemporary economic theory).
133. See id. at 890. Additional benefits were thought to include the elimination of free-riding,
the promotion of interbrand competition, and increased ease of entry. Id. at 891-92. While the
Court also admitted that much potential for abuse with minimum resale price maintenance ex-
ists-most notably the potential for a disguised form of horizontal price fixing-the Court con-
cluded that such a balance between potential benefits and abuses was best resolved through the
rule of reason analysis. Id. at 892.
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conduct that has zero pro-competitive benefits-was not appropriate
for minimum resale price maintenance. 34
After flushing out the economic analysis underlying its decision, the
majority then dealt head on with the problem of stare decisis-in this
case, overruling a long-lived and highly influential prior decision. As
in State Oil, the Court noted that the role of stare decisis in antitrust
cases is weaker than in other areas because of the character of the
Sherman Act as a "common law statute," which allows the Court to
adapt the rules to "meet the dynamics of present economic condi-
tions." 35 In other words, federal courts have the ability to constantly
reevaluate and redefine terms like "restraint of trade" to adapt to
changing economic realities. However, the only actual developments
that the Court spoke of to justify overruling Dr. Miles under a gradual
"common law approach" were a pair of decisions from the 1980s that
limited the scope of the per se rule against resale price maintenance 36
and general demonstrations that vertical agreements were treated dif-
ferently than horizontal arrangements.137 There was, by contrast, no
showing that Dr. Miles was unworkable or that it was shown to be an
inappropriate rule for any particular instance of minimum resale price
maintenance.
Additionally, the Court mentioned a few other types of justifica-
tions that supported overruling prior precedent. First, the Court
noted that, just as in Illinois Tool, both the FTC and the DOJ sup-
ported overruling Dr. Miles in Leegin.138 Thus, the Court was justified
in taking these entities' expertise into account in developing sound
competition policy. Second, the Court recounted the multiple cases
since Dr. Miles that had given the Court a license to overrule antitrust
precedent.139 The Court also recounted certain laws passed during the
twentieth century that did not manifest any intent by Congress to ad-
here to the per se rule against minimum resale price maintenance.140
134. Id. at 899.
135. Leegin, 551 U.S. at 899 (citing Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. Transp. Workers, 451 U.S. 77, 98, n.42
(1981); Nat'l Soc'y of Prof'1 Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978)).
136. See Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717 (1988) (declining to apply the
per se rule to an agreement to terminate a price cutting distributor); Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite
Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984) (requiring a plaintiff to present evidence excluding the possibil-
ity of independent action of a manufacturer and retailer).
137. See Leegin, 551 U.S. at 900-01.
138. See id. at 900.
139. See id. at 901-05 (citing, among other sources, Sylvania and State Oil to support the
notion that updated economic understanding has provided insight into previously overlooked
pro-competitive elements of vertical business practices).
140. See id. at 904-08 (discussing the repeal of the Miller-Tydings Fair Trade Act and the
McGuire Act).
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However, primary support for the majority's conclusion rested in the
academic literature that had rendered Dr. Miles incorrect and
outdated.
Of the cases reviewed in this Article, Leegin contains the most de-
tailed and prominent dissent. 141 As an initial matter, the fact that
Leegin was so closely split in the first place suggests that there is some
uneasiness about overruling stare decisis in the name of heightened
economic understanding. Moreover, the rationales followed in the
dissent, as well as the overall tenor of the dissent's argument, suggest
that many of the assumptions made in the majority opinion are subject
to serious debate.
After reviewing the economic literature as well as administrative
concerns as applied to minimum resale price maintenance-and con-
cluding that such considerations were ultimately not conclusivel 42 -
the dissent reached its primary concern: the effects and importance of
stare decisis in the case. Specifically, the dissent laid out factors that
are normally considered in deciding whether overruling precedent is
appropriate: (1) the age of the precedent and the obviousness of the
error; (2) the workability of the regime created by the precedent; (3)
the extent to which a body of law is settled; (4) reliance interests; and
(5) the law's place in cultural norms.143 Here, the dissent found that
all these factors weighed against overruling Dr. Miles inasmuch as it
was old statutory precedent that created a workable and settled body
of law.144 Moreover, the dissent noted that both the age and the set-
tled nature of the law had created plentiful support for upholding it.145
The dissent also fundamentally disagreed with the majority's as-
sumption that the "common law statute" nature of the Sherman Act
makes it relatively easy to set aside disfavored precedent. Instead, the
dissent adhered to the notion that, when interpreting a statute, the
Court should apply a stronger level of stare decisis inasmuch as Con-
gress is free to alter the results.146 Indeed, the dissent cited to prior
cases construing the very same antitrust laws but that had applied the
141. In light of the strong dissent in Leegin, the unanimity of State Oil is somewhat surprising
notwithstanding the distinctions set out in the Leegin dissent, namely that Albrecht was younger
and less supported than Dr. Miles. Id. at 927.
142. See Leegin, 551 U.S. at 910-18. Like the majority's analysis, this initial portion of the
dissent reviews a considerable amount of academic economic literature in fully analyzing the
practice of minimum resale price maintenance.
143. See id. at 923-27 (citing FEC v. Wis. Right To Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 499-503 (2007)
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)).
144. Id. at 925-26.
145. Id. at 926-27.
146. See id. at 918, 923-24.
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statutory level of stare decisis.147 Moreover, the dissent emphasized
that even within the context of the common law, stare decisis is an
integral part of the legal system and does not provide a basis for more
easily overruling established and settled rules of law.148 Ultimately,
the dissent urged that general legal principles governing the way in
which cases build on one another must trump sudden reversals of
prior law based on novel economic theory.149 In sum, after reading
the dissent, one might think that stare decisis does not play any sort of
diminished role in antitrust law after all.
7. The Major League Baseball Exception: Stare Decisis Lives On
While so many of the Supreme Court's major antitrust decisions in
recent years have been devoted to overruling past precedent, the his-
tory of the Sherman Act contains at least one major exception. In
1922, the Court first dealt with a private action under the Sherman
Act, alleging that the National League of Professional Base Ball Clubs
and the American League of Professional Base Ball Clubs acted ille-
gally by colluding to deny a third club, the Federal League of Profes-
sional Base Ball Players, from engaging in professional baseball at a
national level.150 The Court easily found that baseball was not cov-
ered by the antitrust laws inasmuch as it was wholly intrastate activ-
ity,15' and to the extent that it involved crossing state lines, baseball
exhibitions did not constitute commerce.152 Thus, the Court dismissed
the case, setting a clear precedent that professional baseball was not
covered by the Sherman Act. Indeed, thirty-one years later, the Court
declined to overrule Federal Baseball-over a substantively convinc-
ing dissent-in a brief per curiam opinion solely on the basis of the
147. See Leegin, 551 U.S. at 918 (citing and quoting Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 736
(1977) ("noting, in declining to overrule an earlier case interpreting § 4 of the Clayton Act, that
'considerations of stare decisis weigh heavily in the area of statutory construction, where Con-
gress is free to change this Court's interpretation of its legislation"')).
148. See id. at 927-28 ("The Court suggests that it is following the common-law tradition....
But the common law would not have permitted overruling Dr. Miles in these circumstances.")
(internal citations omitted).
149. See id. at 928 ("[A] Court that rests its decision upon economists' views of the economic
merits should also take account of legal scholars' views about common-law overruling.").
150. See Fed. Baseball Club of Balt. v. Nat'l League of Prof'1 Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200
(1922).
151. See id. at 208 ("The business is giving exhibitions of base ball, which are purely state
affairs.").
152. See id. at 209 ("[Baseball exhibitions] although made for money would not be called
trade of commerce in the commonly accepted use of those words."). The same legal conclusion
was reached almost a decade earlier by the New York State Supreme Court in American League
Baseball Club v. Chase, 149 N.Y.S. 6, 15-17 (1914).
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precedential effect of Federal Baseball and the related theory of con-
gressional acquiescence. 1 53
Courts continued to rely on Federal Baseball despite the fact that
economic circumstances and understandings had changed and despite
the fact that the term "commerce," as used in the commerce clause,
had expanded considerably since 1922.154 In fact, in refusing to ex-
tend baseball's antitrust exemption to professional boxing,155 thea-
tre,156 football,'57 and basketball,158 the Court itself noted that the
staying power of Federal Baseball was "unrealistic, inconsistent, or il-
logical" if not for the strong considerations underlying stare decisis. 59
Nonetheless, in the most recent Supreme Court iteration of the base-
ball-antitrust doctrine in 1972, the Court continued to stand by the
precedential effect of Federal Baseball.160 In doing so, the Court con-
tinued to recount the Congressional attempts and failures to intervene
with the Court's decisions on baseball.' 6 ' Ultimately, however, the
Court relied exclusively on stare decisis in justifying the decision to
continue the baseball exemption and deny such status to other sports.
And in a similar fashion to Toolson, Flood was countered by a strong
pair of dissents that emphasized the changed legal understanding of
153. See Toolson v. N.Y. Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356, 357 (1953) ("Congress has had the ruling
under consideration but has not seen fit to bring such business under these laws by legislation
.... Without re-examination of the underlying issues, the judgments below are affirmed on the
authority of [Federal Baseball] . . . ."). The dissent, by contrast, engaged in a brief overview of
the state of professional baseball in 1953 and would have concluded that "[w]hatever may have
been the situation when the Federal Baseball Club case was decided in 1922," it was by then
obvious that no one could conclude "that organized baseball, in 1953, [was] still ... not engaged
in interstate trade or commerce." Id. at 357.
154. See, e.g., Salerno v. Am. League of Prof. Baseball Clubs, 429 F.2d 1003, 1005 (2d Cir.
1970) ("We freely acknowledge our belief that Federal Baseball was not one of Mr. Justice
Holmes' happiest days, that the rationale of Toolson is extremely dubious and that, to use the
Supreme Court's own adjectives, the distinction between baseball and other professional sports
is 'unrealistic,' 'inconsistent' and 'illogical.' . . . However . . . we continue to believe that the
Supreme Court should retain the exclusive privilege of overruling its own decisions.").
155. See United States v. Int'l Boxing Club of N.Y., 348 U.S. 236 (1955) (declining to extend
antitrust exemption to professional boxing).
156. See United States v. Shubert, 348 U.S. 222 (1955) (declining to extend antitrust exemp-
tion to theatre productions); Hart v. B.F. Keith Vaudeville Exch., 262 U.S. 271 (1923) (declining
to extend antitrust exemption to vaudeville performances).
157. See Radovich v. NFL, 352 U.S. 445 (1957) (declining to extend antitrust exemption to
professional football).
158. See Haywood v. NBA, 401 U.S. 1204,1205 (1971) (in chambers opinion) (noting that no
antitrust exemption applied to professional basketball). The Court has also since noted that
hockey and golf similarly enjoy no exemption from antitrust. See Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258,
283 (1972).
159. Radovich, 352 U.S. at 452.
160. See Flood, 407 U.S. at 258.
161. See id. at 273-74, 281-83.
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commerce, 162 the irrelevance of Congressional inaction,163 and the ec-
onomic realities prevailing in 1972.164
As the dissents in both Toolson and Flood made clear, many justifi-
cations would support overruling Federal Baseball.165 Likewise, base-
ball's antitrust exemption has been extensively critiqued in the
academic community with the majority of scholarly writings on the
topic concluding that baseball's exemption from antitrust is no longer
valid.166 To this day, however, the exemption appears firmly rooted in
antitrust jurisprudence.16 7 Thus, while the Supreme Court has over-
ruled multiple prominent antitrust precedents over the last few de-
162. See id. at 286 (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("In 1922 the Court had a narrow, parochial view
of commerce. With the demise of the old landmarks of that era .. . the whole concept of com-
merce has changed.").
163. See id. at 287-88 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (noting that relying on congressional inaction is
out of line with the Court's normal practice of declining to infer congressional intent from mere
inaction) (citing Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119-21 (1940)).
164. Id. at 291 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("The Commissioner of Baseball admits that under
present concepts of interstate commerce defendants are engaged therein. There can be no doubt
that the admission is warranted by today's reality.") (internal citations omitted).
165. Indeed, even in 1970 the Second Circuit noted that "we should not fall out of our chairs
with surprise at the news that Federal Baseball and Toolson had been overruled." Salerno v.
Am. League of Prof'1 Baseball Club, 429 F.2d 1003, 1005 (2d Cir. 1970). Likewise, the Supreme
Court acknowledged more recently in State Oil that the baseball exemption is "an aberration ...
resting on a recognition and an acceptance of baseball's unique characteristics and needs." State
Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 19 (1997) (internal citations omitted).
166. See, e.g., Brittany Van Roo, One Trilogy That Should Go Without A Sequel: Why the
Baseball Antitrust Exemption Should Be Repealed, 21 MARO. SPORTS L. REV. 381 (2010); Carol
Daugherty Rasnic & Dr. Reinhard Resch, Limiting High Earnings of Professional Athletes:
Would the American Concept of Salary Caps Be Compatible With Austrian and German Labor
Laws?, 7 WILLAMETTE SPORTs L.J. 57, 58 (2010) (referring to the Court's "inexplicable, exemp-
tion of professional baseball from the antitrust laws"); Stephen J. Matzura, Comment, Will Ma-
ple Bats Splinter Baseball's Antitrust Exemptions?: The Rule Of Reason Steps to the Plate, 18
WIDENER L.J. 975, 994 (2009) ("[T]his judicially-constructed exemption that has no compelling
reasons for its existence, beyond slavish adherence to precedent, remains an aberration."); Mor-
gen A. Sullivan, Note, "A Derelict in the Stream of the Law": Overruling Baseball's Antitrust
Exemption, 48 DuKE L.J. 1265, 1275 (1999) ("After recognizing that the positive inaction doc-
trine lacks the strength to justify perpetuating the original Toolson holding, the Court should
apply the State Oil analysis to reverse Flood and eliminate baseball's illogical antitrust exemp-
tion."); Edmund P. Edmonds, Over Forty Years in the On-Deck Circle: Congress And The Base-
ball Antitrust Exemption, 19 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 627, 660 (1994) ("[T]he exemption is a
judicial aberration without justification."). At the same time, there is a minority of writers who
have expressed support for the exemption. See, e.g., Nathaniel Grow, In Defense Of Baseball's
Antitrust Exemption, 49 AM. Bus. L.J. 211 (2012); see also Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 280 n.16
(1972) (collecting extensive and mixed commentary on the various sports' relations to antitrust
from before 1972).
167. See, e.g., MLB v. Crist, 331 F.3d 1177, 1188 (11th Cir. 2003) (relying upon the antitrust
exemption despite its "dubious premise" and potentially anticompetitive effects). Moreover, an
outright exemption may no longer even be needed in light of the fact that the Court has recog-
nized in an analogous sports context that the nature of athletic competition-and the inherent
need for coordinated competition therein-is proper to take into account in an otherwise normal
rule of reason analysis. See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 101 (1984)
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cades-even without absolute or near consensus regarding the
doctrines in question-despite the shield of stare decisis, it has con-
sistently clung to the one doctrine which almost everyone seems to
believe is justified only by stare decisis. Specifically, it seems as
though the Court, by passing the ball to Congress, has treated this
exemption as an example of the strong form of stare decisis normally
associated with statutory interpretation. 168 As such, the Court has re-
fused to incorporate updated economic analysis and has failed to treat
the Sherman Act as a "common law statute" in the baseball exemp-
tion context.
III. ANALYSIS: IN SEARCH OF THE PROPER ROLE OF STARE
DECISIS IN ANTITRUST LAW
Having reviewed the major cases in which the Supreme Court ei-
ther implicitly or explicitly set aside concerns of stare decisis while
overturning antitrust precedent, this Part takes up the relative
strengths and weaknesses of the justifications for doing so. As the
case law reveals, the most prominent explanations for overriding stare
decisis have been new economic understandings as well as refinements
to the way antitrust law functions. Additionally, the cases allude to
the notion of the Sherman Act as a "common law statute," and, more
recently, attention has been paid to the positions of the relevant anti-
trust agencies in antitrust cases-even in the context of private anti-
trust suits.
A. New Economic Findings Used to Justify New Rules
Of the cases surveyed, a shift in contemporary economic under-
standing was used as a primary justification for departing from estab-
lished precedent in Sylvania, State Oil, Illinois Tool, and Leegin.169
Indeed, in Sylvania, State Oil, and Leegin it was the only substantive
reason given for overruling prior law. 170 However, overruling cases in
the name of heightened economic understanding, without gradual
(noting that a rule of reason analysis was appropriate because some forms of horizontal restraint
in a sports context "are essential if the product is to be available at all").
168. See supra note 12 and accompanying text; Jamie Darin Prenkert, Bizarro Statutory Stare
Decisis, 28 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 217, 235 n.114 ("The Court's most famous and enduring
example of adhering to a statutory interpretation of increasingly lessening viability involved
[Federal Baseball] . . . . The basis for this 'super-strong presumption' of validity for Federal
Baseball was that it was a statutory interpretation decision and Congress could have, but did not,
override it.").
169. See supra Part II.C.
170. See, e.g., Lopatka, supra note 39, at 633-34 (noting that Sylvania was decided primarily, if
not exclusively, based on economic literature).
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case law progression, is not without its problems. It might thus be
reserved only for the most extreme cases in which there is virtual eco-
nomic consensus that a prior rule is not merely non-ideal but, rather,
that the older rule is demonstrably anticompetitive. This is not to say
that economic theory plays no role in adjusting antitrust law-it surely
does and should.171 Rather, this Part argues that contemporary eco-
nomic trends should not lead to abrupt breaks with stare decisis with-
out sufficient time for the doctrine or economic consensus to develop.
As a practical matter, overruling antitrust precedent in the name of
contemporary economic trends is not a suitable or fair endeavor for
the legal counsel or judicial institutions involved in a case. For in-
stance, to the extent the Supreme Court is willing to overrule prece-
dent on the basis of economic trends, all parties involved will have to
be steeped in economic literature and may be required to come to
conclusions that mainstream economists have themselves failed to
agree upon.172 While it is generally fair to expect antitrust counsel to
understand the business context and general commercial strategies of
a client, it would seem odd to create a system where all antitrust coun-
sel must be trained microeconomists. The problem, however, is not
merely that lawyers or judges may lack economic backgrounds-un-
doubtedly some do and some do not-the more important point is
that private lawsuits and case-by-case resolution may not be an insti-
tutionally effective way to handle large economic decisions. 73 While
courts could, and do, take expert testimony in a case and use that in
lieu of institutional research, the choice and contents of expert reports
will generally be a decision of the private parties in an antitrust suit
and, thus, may leave out factors that would be relevant to the broader
171. The practice of "adjusting antitrust doctrine to reflect advances in economic theory has a
solid pedigree." Alan J. Meese, Economic Theory, Trader Freedom, and Consumer Welfare:
State Oil Co. v. Khan and the Continuing Incoherence of Antitrust Doctrine, 84 CORNELL L. REV.
763, 781 (1999).
172. Reza Dibadj, Saving Antitrust, 75 U. COLo. L. REV. 745, 786 (2004) ("'[I1n too many
instances antitrust tribunals are simply not up to handling Post-Chicago theory. Judges do not
know enough economics; the economics itself is insufficiently capable of sorting out anticompeti-
tive from competitive or harmless explanations; the American jury system turns complex fact
findings into chaos."') (quoting Herbert Hovenkamp, Post-Chicago Antitrust: A Review and Cri-
tique, 2001 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 257, 275 (2001)).
173. See, e.g., Rebecca Haw, Amicus Briefs and the Sherman Act: Why Antitrust Needs a New
Deal, 89 TEX. L. REV. 1247, 1270 (2011) (noting that the Supreme Court may have trouble
reaching economic conclusions "because the Justices misunderstand economic theory and data,
they sometimes make errors in their economic analysis" and because "without the right mecha-
nisms for gathering information, the Court sometimes makes decisions without considering all
the relevant data"). Perhaps legislatures, agencies, or other bodies with suitable fact-finding
capabilities are better suited to address unresolved economic quandaries.
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commercial practice in question.174 Likewise, excessive reliance on
amicus briefs may undermine the integrity of the adversarial
proceeding.175
Moreover, if antitrust is left to develop through the adoption and
overruling of legal doctrine, lawyers and judges will have to master
more than just background economics. They will also have to remain
up-to-date on contemporary economic trends in order to be able to
argue that doctrines should be overruled at the proper time on behalf
of a client. Requiring parties to ask the Court to overrule prior case
law as a way to resolve litigation seems unfair because such parties
will now be up against a steep hill to alter the status quo.176 Likewise,
leaving it to parties to constantly request changes in the law will not
lead to an efficient and smooth administration of justice in the anti-
trust area. Thus, although the law often leaves it to private litigants to
push for the reversal of law in other contexts, this should not be made
the norm in antitrust litigation.
Additionally, allowing for frequent overruling in antitrust ignores
many of the benefits that stare decisis usually confers. For instance,
allowing parties to re-litigate settled questions of law may greatly in-
crease the already heavy administrative costs associated with antitrust
litigation.' 77 This is especially true when the former legal scheme has
not proved unworkable or impractical to apply in the first place. Fur-
thermore, as a matter of fairness, this approach ignores the potentially
weighty reliance interests on a whole slew of parties who may have
expended effort and resources to conform their conduct to established
rules of law. Thus, abrupt overruling of established precedent on the
basis of contemporary economic trends should be disfavored. An ex-
ception, if any, might be appropriate for cases where there is virtual
economic consensus that a prior rule is wholly anticompetitive and has
little or no utility in advancing sound competition policy.
For instance, the Court in Leegin overruled a rule of law that was
not demonstrated to be always inappropriate or unworkable as a
174. See generally Lopatka, supra note 39 (examining the role of expert testimony in antitrust
cases).
175. See Haw, supra note 173, at 1259-66 (listing problems with the Court relying on amicus
briefs in antitrust adjudication).
176. See, e.g., State v. Mauchley, 67 P.3d 477, 481 (Utah 2003) ("'Those asking us to overturn
prior precedent have a substantial burden of persuasion' due to 'the doctrine of stare decisis."')
(quoting State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 398 (Utah 1994)).
177. See, e.g., FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, MANUAL FOR COMPLEx LITIGATION § 30 (4th ed.
2004) ("Antitrust litigation can . . . involve voluminous documentary and testimonial evidence,
extensive discovery, complicated legal, factual, and technical (particularly economic) questions,
numerous parties and attorneys, and substantial sums of money.... Antitrust trials usually are
long, and there often are controversies over settlements and attorney fees.").
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scheme.'78 Although the Court cited to two cases imposing some limi-
tations on the per se rule, it pointed to no declining influence of the
per se rule against resale price maintenance.179 As the dissent noted,
there was also no consensus among economists concerning the full ec-
onomic impacts of resale price maintenance.180 Other than noting
that stare decisis was less of a concern in antitrust, the Court did not
deal with the substantive concerns that usually counsel against over-
ruling precedent. For example, the dissent suggested that there was
substantial reliance on Dr. Miles coupled with no prior indications
that Dr. Miles was of diminished precedential value.18' In fact, older
cases that have been continually affirmed are thought to have greater
precedential value.182 Thus, the decision overruling Dr. Miles argua-
bly disrupted the appearance of the consistent rule of law and upset
settled private expectation interests. At the very least, the Court
would have been more justified in focusing on what particular factual
elements, if any, of the Leegin case made a per se rule inapplicable,
thereby setting the stage for a potential gradual erosion of the per se
rule against resale price maintenance.
B. Doctrinal Refinement Compels Overruling
In Copperweld, ARCO, and Illinois Tool, the Court explained its
departure from stare decisis based upon doctrinal changes and the de-
sire to keep elements of the law consistent with the underlying aims
178. See McMillian, supra note 40, at 452 (noting how the Court "ignored the principles be-
hind stare decisis and injected more tumult into an already-unpredictable area of the law" by
overruling Dr. Miles on the basis of its understanding of the economics of resale price
maintenance).
179. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 918 (2007).
180. See id. at 915 (finding no "economic consensus" concerning the "harms" and "benefits"
of resale price maintenance) (Breyer, J., dissenting). Furthermore, some factions of Congress, as
well as certain state legislators, continue to believe in the need for a per se rule. See, e.g., S. REP.
No. 111-227, at 2, 2010 WL 2880189 (July 21, 2010) (describing proposed federal legislation
attempting to restore the per se ban against minimum resale price maintenance); O'Brien v.
Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc., 277 P.3d 1062, 1082-83 (Kan. 2012) (holding that resale
price maintenance is illegal per se under state law). Likewise, at least some other countries
continue imposing harsher rules against minimum resale price maintenance. See, e.g., EURO-
PEAN COMMISSION, GUIDELINES ON VERTICAL RESTRAINTS § 2.10 (Apr. 20, 2010), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/legislation/guidelines-vertical-en.pdf ("[Riesale price
maintenance (RPM) . . . [is] treated as a hardcore restriction. Including RPM in an agreement
gives rise to the presumption that the agreement restricts competition.").
181. Leegin, 551 U.S. at 925-26 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
182. Id.; see also Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 769 (1984) (Brennan,
J., concurring) (noting that Dr. Miles "has stood for 73 years, and Congress has certainly been
aware of its existence throughout that time .. . . Under these circumstances, I see no reason for
us to depart from our longstanding interpretation of the Act").
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and purposes of the Sherman Act.18 3 Aspects of change grounded in
theoretical economic updates and doctrinal refinement do, or course,
significantly overlap and are not divided by any bright line. However,
the distinction between economic theory and doctrinal refinement
may be meaningful for courts and antitrust practitioners to bear in
mind in evaluating the continued validity of older rules. As described
earlier, overruling a case based on economic trends can sometimes
involve abruptly declaring older settled rules incorrect. This approach
is often characterized by primary reliance on academic economic
works as well as by abstract discussions of economic consequences. In
contrast, doctrinal refinement is a mode of legal reasoning familiar to
many other areas whereby courts refine legal rules over time to ensure
that they continue to serve the underlying function of the discipline in
question. This method is characterized by concern with how relevant
precedent should or would apply to a case as well as by addressing the
concrete facts as alleged in the case. In fact, this is the essence of the
common law reasoning.184 Such changes tend to be gradual and em-
phasize the way in which rules slowly erode to make room for new law
that takes into account modern realities and practices. In other words,
the process of doctrinal refinement does not focus on the incorrect-
ness of prior doctrine but, rather, on the way that older rules may no
longer be appropriate in contemporary settings.
Although this Article cautions courts to proceed slowly in overrul-
ing cases based on heightened economic understanding alone, it is ap-
propriate and often necessary for courts to update the law in order to
make sure it continues to serve its function in ever-changing social and
commercial realities.185 This is not to say that new economic models
should not be noted. After all, sometimes new economic understand-
ing can coincide with a situation that is ripe for doctrinal change. For
instance, in Illinois Tool, economic factors as well as other factors-
such as parallel changes in the patent misuse doctrine and DOJ and
FTC positions-suggested that a particular doctrine that was ripe for
retirement.18 6 However, such changes should take into account all the
concerns implicated by the rule of stare decisis. For example, the slow
evolvement of doctrinal advancement ensures that reliance interests
are not displaced too hastily. Moreover, this legal mode of reasoning
does not require all antitrust counsel to become trained economists to
183. See supra Part II.C.
184. See, e.g., Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451, 461 (2001) (noting that the "foundation of
the commbn law system" is "the incremental and reasoned development of precedent").
185. See Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 731-32 (1988).
186. See supra Part II.C.5.
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understand the development of the law. Instead, informed members
of the bar and the judiciary will be able to track legal rules and doc-
trines as they develop in order to ensure sound competition policy.
Likewise, limiting overruling to gradual doctrinal refinement will cre-
ate an environment where parties will know when it is appropriate to
argue for legal rules to be overturned-namely, when they have been
eroded over time by practical changes, not just when economic theory
demonstrates potential pro-competitive elements. Finally, the admin-
istrative costs associated with relitigating settled questions of law
would be limited to the extent that overruling precedent would be a
rarer phenomenon.
The decision in Copperweld demonstrates how it may be appropri-
ate to overrule precedent when the Court acts to ensure that antitrust
rules keep up with modern reality and that those rules continue to
implement the guiding principles of the Sherman Act. Copperweld
first focused on the notion that the intra-enterprise doctrine had not
been fully addressed in its own right; rather, it had crept into the case
law as a sort of unstated assumption, thereby weakening the doctrinal
foundation for the intra-enterprise doctrine. 87 Furthermore, the
Court primarily relied on some of the guiding principles of the Sher-
man Act-the crucial distinction between unilateral and collusive con-
duct.188 Inasmuch as the illegality of contracts in restraint of trade is
addressed to collusive conduct, the Court found that, as a policy mat-
ter, it would be inappropriate to penalize conduct that arose through
decisions of actors within the same entity.189 Finally, the Court
stressed the fact that modern business arrangements must be taken
into account and that, just as a company might legitimately decide to
organize itself into unincorporated subdivisions, it might choose to or-
ganize as a series of parent and subsidiary corporations.' Thus, it
would be unfairly formalistic to penalize the latter but not the former.
In sum, the decision to overrule the intra-enterprise doctrine in Cop-
perweld was a proper function of the Court's role to refine antitrust
doctrine and ensure that it remained up-to-date with ever evolving
business conditions and economic realities.
187. See Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 760 (1984) ("In no
case has the Court considered the merits of the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine in depth.
Indeed, the concept arose from a far narrower rule. Although the Court has expressed approval
of the doctrine on a number of occasions, a finding of intra-enterprise conspiracy was in all but
perhaps one instance unnecessary to the result.").
188. See id. at 767-69.
189. Id. at 769.
190. Id. at 770.
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C. The Sherman Act as a Common Law Statute
Both Leegin and State Oil invoked the common law nature of the
Sherman Act to justify a departure from established legal rules.191 In
doing so, the Court used this common law element to overrule anti-
trust precedent that was no longer believed to be rooted in sound eco-
nomic theory.192 The Court applied this logic not because of changed
circumstances but, rather, because the economic rule announced in
the earlier case was not economically accurate. Likewise, some com-
mentators believe that the common law nature of the Sherman Act
justifies gutting established precedent in order to implement up-to-
date economics.193 However, as discussed earlier, this approach to
overruling cases should be disfavored and, in any event, it reflects an
unwarranted use of the Sherman Act's common law nature.
Near the beginning of Sherman Act enforcement, there was con-
cern about whether terms incorporated within the Act retained their
meaning from the common law prohibitions against restraints of
trade.194 In any event, though, the Supreme Court believed that, sub-
sequent to adopting the Sherman Act, the antitrust laws would change
to accommodate newer realities.195 More recently, the Supreme
Court has consistently held that the Sherman Act promotes a common
law approach to the law whereby antitrust law includes the potential
191. See supra Part II.C.
192. See supra notes 92-93 and accompanying text.
193. See, e.g., Meese, supra note 34, at 717 ("Surely, the common law delegation to antitrust
courts is sufficiently capacious to empower judges to, for instance, abandon a total welfare pre-
mise in favor of one focused on the welfare of purchasers in the relevant market.").
194. While some of the earlier cases denied that the statute incorporated the common law,
United States v. Trans-Mo. Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 327 (1897) ("We are of opinion that the
language used in the title refers to and includes and was intended to include those restraints and
monopolies which are made unlawful in the body of the statute" and not as defined in the com-
mon law.), many subsequent decisions appeared to assume that the central terms of the Sherman
Act were intended to incorporate the common law concepts. See, e.g., Nash v. United States, 229
U.S. 373, 377 (1913); Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 50-51 (1911) ("It is
certain that those terms, at least in their rudimentary meaning, took their origin in the common
law, and were also familiar in the law of this country prior to and at the time of the adoption of
the act in question."); United States v. Am. Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 179 (1911). In any event,
legislative history tends to support the notion that the Sherman Act codified the common law
against restraints of trade. See, e.g., Maurice E. Stucke, Should the Government Prosecute Mo-
nopolies?, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 497, 503-04 (2009) ("Senator Sherman described his remedial
statute 'to enforce by civil process in the courts of the United States the common law against
monopolies."') (quoting HANS B. THORELLI, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: ORIGINATION
OF AN AMERICAN TRADITION 181 (1955)).
195. See, e.g., Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 406 (1911) ("With
respect to contracts in restraint of trade, the earlier doctrine of the common law has been sub-
stantially modified in adaptation to modem conditions.").
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to grow and cover ever changing realities. 196 Such an approach is
highly sensible, especially in light of the concise wording of the Sher-
man Act and its omission of any type of specific behavior or
arrangement.
However, as the dissent in Leegin emphasized, even if the Sherman
Act is intended to function as the common law would, no one suggests
that stare decisis is inapplicable in the common law.197 Indeed, stare
decisis is essentially a common law principle. 198 The common law
functions through incremental modifications to existing doctrine, not
through wholesale rejections of prior legal rules. Thus, using the com-
mon law nature of the Sherman Act to permit blunt repudiations of
doctrines based on new economic models is unfaithful to the concept
of the common law.
The idea of the Sherman Act as a common law statute is best under-
stood as expressing the notion that the high level of stare decisis nor-
mally associated with statutory construction does not apply to the
Sherman Act. 199 This approach is particularly fitting in interpreting
the Sherman Act when the Court is not interpreting detailed statutory
instructions but, rather, making sense out of a broad mandate to pro-
mote economic welfare. The Court, therefore, need not always wait
for Congress to step in and alter the Court's interpretation of the
Sherman Act. However, when the Court does change course, it
should do so in a way that is deliberate and predictable. Specifically,
the Court should be attuned to the institutional nature of the law
wherein courts refrain from engaging in policymaking due to their in-
196. See, e.g., Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 731 (1988) ("The term
'restraint of trade' in the statute, like the term at common law, refers not to a particular list of
agreements, but to a particular economic consequence, which may be produced by quite differ-
ent sorts of agreements in varying times and circumstances.").
197. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, at 926 (2007) (Breyer, J
dissenting)
198. See Jeffrey J. Brookner, Note, Bankruptcy Courts and Stare Decisis: The Need for Re-
structuring, 27 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 313, 313 (1993) (noting that "stare decisis" is "a corner-
stone of the common law").
199. As already noted, the Court has, at times, relied on the "strong form" of stare decisis
associated with statutory interpretation even in antitrust cases. See, e.g., Square D Co. v. Niag-
ara Frontier Tariff Bureau, Inc. 476 U.S. 409, 424 (1986) ("We conclude, however, that the devel-
opments in the six decades since Keogh was decided are insufficient to overcome the strong
presumption of continued validity that adheres in the judicial interpretation of a statute."); Ill.
Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 736 (1977) ("In considering whether to cut back or abandon
the Hanover Shoe rule, we must bear in mind that considerations of stare decisis weigh heavily in
the area of statutory construction, where Congress is free to change this Court's interpretation of
its legislation."). Such statements, however, would appear to be totally at odds with a concep-
tion of the Sherman Act as a common law statute. The approach advocated in this article can be
thought of as a middle ground between rigid statutory stare decisis and open-ended policy
making.
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ability to receive broad input and take multiple segments of society
into account in policymaking. In other words, the common law nature
of the Sherman Act authorizes the Court to engage in doctrinal refine-
ment of antitrust law but not to sit as a legislature constantly promul-
gating and repealing laws as it sees fit.200
For example, the common law nature of the Sherman Act would be
a proper justification for the Supreme Court to overrule Federal Base-
ball and eliminate the infamous professional baseball exemption from
antitrust. In Flood, the Court left the option of including baseball
under the Sherman Act to Congress's discretion, notwithstanding the
fact that the entire basis for the holding in Federal Baseball has been
eroded by the reality of commercial sports as well as the failure to give
any other sport an exemption.201 It was also widely accepted that
commerce had taken on a broader meaning by 1972.202 In other
words, even if Federal Baseball made sense in an earlier era, the Court
would have been fully justified in updating the law to account for
modern realities. Similarly, the fact that Congress has tried and failed
to legislatively overrule the baseball exemption should not be taken to
tie the hands of the common law.203 Moreover, by the 1970s it would
have been no surprise to lower courts or academics if the Court had
reversed Federal Baseball-the holding had been gradually eroded by
the Court's failure to apply a similar exemption to a number of other
professional sports.204 Thus, eliminating the baseball exemption
would have been a valid application of the common law nature of the
Sherman Act in order to refine and adapt competition policy to ad-
200. It is generally accepted that stare decisis is even weaker in the area of constitutional law.
See supra note 12 and accompanying text. While a full discussion of stare decisis in the realm of
constitutional law is beyond the scope of this article, the more cautious approach advocated here
may not be appropriate in constitutional law where Congressional action to amend the constitu-
tion to address judicial decisions is exceedingly rare. See e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, MAKING OUR
DEMOCRACY WORK 152 (2010) ("Normally, the only practical way to change a constitutional
decision is for the Court to reconsider it.").
201. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 282-85 (1972).
202. See, e.g., Burke v. Ford, 389 U.S. 320, 321 (1967) ("For it is well established that an
activity which does not itself occur in interstate commerce comes within the scope of the Sher-
man Act if it substantially affects interstate commerce.") (emphasis omitted).
203. See, e.g., Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S.
164, 186 (1994) ("It is impossible to assert with any degree of assurance that congressional fail-
ure to act represents affirmative congressional approval of the [courts'] statutory interpreta-
tion.") (internal quotations omitted).
204. See, e.g., Salerno v. Am. League of Prof'1 Baseball Clubs, 429 F.2d 1003, 1005 (2d Cir.
1970); Barton J. Menitove, Baseball's Antitrust Exemption: The Limits of Stare Decisis, 12 B.C.
L. REV. 737, 746 (1971) ("In light of the foregoing problems, the Supreme Court should at least
reconsider the matter of baseball with a view towards weighing all the equities involved.").
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vance the basic policies of the Sherman Act without running rough-
shod over the concerns implicated by stare decisis.
D. Stare Decisis in the Regulatory Context of Antitrust
Some have argued that the administrative context in which antitrust
enforcement agencies play a large role in the policing of competition
policy can justify the lower standard of stare decisis applied to the
antitrust laws. 205 However, to the extent that this argument relies on a
weaker version of stare decisis in administrative proceedings, the im-
pact on antitrust would seem to be limited. For one thing, it is not
entirely clear that a lesser standard of stare decisis applies in adminis-
trative proceedings at all.2 0 6 Moreover, even if that were demonstra-
bly the case, most big antitrust disputes are ultimately decided by
Article III courts. First, private suits-a primary tool for enforcement
of antitrust laws under the federal scheme-are only brought in dis-
trict courts. Second, the DOJ, which has half of the responsibility of
enforcing the antitrust laws, has no internal trial-like proceedings. In-
stead, civil and criminal cases are brought only to federal courts.
Thus, of the many big antitrust cases brought,. only those brought by
the FTC have a chance of going through some stage of administrative
litigation. 207 Thus, Article III courts will, and should, stick to conven-
tional jurisprudential approaches-including stare decisis-in adjudi-
cating antitrust cases.208
That is not to say that the existence of antitrust agencies does not
matter at all. As discussed earlier, for instance, the Court took notice
of the position of the DOJ and the FTC in both Illinois Tool and
Leegin in order to bolster support for a major change in antitrust
law.209 Thus, in private cases it may appropriate for the Court to ac-
cept the positions of the DOJ and the FTC as persuasive authority.
Certainly, however, when the federal agencies are parties to a suit,
their positions cannot be taken by the court as impartial persuasive
205. See supra Part II.B.
206. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
207. For a discussion on the basics of FTC administrative litigation, see D. Bruce Hoffman &
M. Sean Royall, Administrative Litigation at the FTC: Past, Present, and Future, 71 ANTITRUST
L.J. 319 (2003). In contrast, the DOJ is not an administrative agency and has no independent
internal judicial function.
208. Some scholars have noted that, even in the judicial setting, antitrust cases are treated like
administrative proceedings because of the reliance on outside participation, such as amicus
briefs. See, e.g., Haw, supra note 173, at 1255 ("When the Supreme Court relies on amici for
economic arguments in deciding an antitrust case, it acts like an agency soliciting comments on a
proposed rulemaking.").
209. See supra Part II.C.
[Vol. 12:1
STARE DECISIS IN ANTITRUST
authority. Still, however, antitrust agencies may play some enhanced
role in antitrust law's stable development. 210
IV. SOME SUGGESTIONS GOING FORWARD
The last portion of this Article provides constructive ideas and sug-
gestions that are intended to ensure that the case law remains coher-
ent and cohesive despite the accepted understanding that stare decisis
has a diminished role in antitrust. First, as noted earlier, courts can
strive to avoid overruling cases based solely on newer economic mod-
els and instead rely on slow doctrinal development. However, inas-
much as antitrust law needs to keep up with rapidly changing
commercial realities while at the same time upholding the rule of law
and respecting reliance interests, some suggestions and innovations
may help further those goals. For example, the Supreme Court-as
well as district and circuit courts-can try to preemptively avoid situa-
tions in which overruling precedents will become a routine component
of the law. Moreover, the Court can take greater care in shaping anti-
trust jurisprudence to give citizens a more stable base of reliance and
to ensure that doctrinal changes are not unduly sharp and abrupt.
A. Moving From Per Se Rules to the Sliding Scale
In recent years, much of the Supreme Court's activity in overruling
precedent has concerned the repeal of per se rules. For instance, Syl-
vania, State Oil, and Leegin involved the overruling of per se rules of
conduct, and Illinois Tool abrogated an automatic presumption of
market power. While this may be apparent only in hindsight, the idea
of compartmentalizing antitrust scrutiny into tight boxes like per se
rules versus the rule of reason does not seem to have served antitrust
well and has led to the perceived need to overrule antitrust precedents
with relative frequency. In fact, the Supreme Court, as well as numer-
ous commentators, has more recently acknowledged that antitrust
scrutiny should focus more on the ultimate harm to consumers with a
sliding scale approach that takes into consideration the severity, overt-
ness, and alternative potential purposes of the conduct that is alleged
to be in restraint of trade.211 This has particularly come to the fore
210. See infra Part IV.B.
211. In other words, antitrust scrutiny is not merely composed of two rigid layers of per se
rules and the rule of reason. See, e.g., Cal. Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 779 (1999) ("The
truth is that our categories of analysis of anticompetitive effect are less fixed than terms like 'per
se,' 'quick look,' and 'rule of reason' tend to make them appear. We have recognized, for exam-
ple, that 'there is often no bright line separating per se from Rule of Reason analysis,' since
'considerable inquiry into market conditions' may be required before the application of any so-
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with the acceptance of additional levels of review, such as the "quick
look. "212
Thus, it appears that, moving forward, courts might do better by
exhibiting more caution before imposing blanket restrictions-like
per se rules-that go beyond the facts of a case in front of them. 2 13
Doing so may alleviate the need to overrule precedent solely on the
basis of later economic advancements that suggest that a previously
illicit practice has some redeeming pro-competitive virtues. Instead,
courts will be free to focus more on the substance of various business
practices, such as the evils inherent in particular contractual arrange-
ments as well as the pro-competitive benefits, if any, that an entity is
actually pursuing by engaging in that conduct. In some cases, this ap-
proach will indeed lead to more complex litigation and associated
costs, but it is nonetheless preferable to a jurisprudence that leads to a
cycle of rigid rules followed by frequent overruling leading to a state
of legal flux. Importantly, a per se rule-or at least an approach in-
cluding a bare minimum analysis-should remain appropriate in in-
stances of "hard core" price fixing, bid rigging, or the like, inasmuch
as that leaves the government sufficient room to enforce egregious
called 'per se' condemnation is justified.") (quoting NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of
Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 104 n.26 (1984)); see also Edward D. Cavanagh, The Rule of Reason Re-
Examined, 67 Bus. LAW. 435, 436 (2012) ("The Rule of Reason is best viewed as a continuum.");
Spencer Weber Waller, Justice Stevens and the Rule Of Reason, 62 SMU L. REV. 693, 700 (2009)
(crediting Justice Stevens for the development of a "comprehensive view of the rule of reason"
wherein "the rule of reason is not a stark choice between per se illegality and an endless explora-
tion of intent, effects, and balancing," but, rather, it should be regarded as a "continuum where
some conduct is presumed to unreasonably restrict competition (and is hence unlawful) where
no potential justifications are permitted"); Mark A. Lemley & Christopher R. Leslie, Categorical
Analysis in Antitrust Jurisprudence, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1207, 1216 (2008) ("Some antitrust com-
mentators depict the relationship between per se and rule of reason analysis as less a dichotomy
than a continuum.") (internal quotation omitted); Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., Reconciling the Per Se
and Rule of Reason Approaches to Antitrust Analysis, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 685, 688 (1991) ("A
synthesis between the ... [per se rule and the rule of reason] can be achieved by viewing the per
se rule and rule of reason not as opposite approaches to antitrust analysis but as related parts of
a continuum. The objective under both approaches should be to judge the competitive purpose
and effect of the defendant's conduct.").
212. "Quick look" was recognized by the Court as an intermediate mode of antitrust scrutiny
reserved for conduct that is "so plainly anticompetitive that courts need undertake only a cur-
sory examination before imposing antitrust liability." Texaco, Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 7 n.3
(2006). The Court has recognized that quick look was the appropriate mode of review in three
prominent cases. See FTC v. Ind. Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986) (concerning agreement
to withhold dental services); NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984)
(concerning agreements limiting the number of college games that could be televised); Nat'l
Soc'y of Prof'1 Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978) (concerning agreement forbidding
discussions of price).
213. Indeed, courts have already cautioned for decades against "overzealous application of
the per se doctrine." Phil Tolkan Datsun, Inc. v. Greater Milwaukee Datsun Dealers' Adver.
Ass'n, Inc., 672 F.2d 1280, 1284 (7th Cir. 1982).
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violations without taking the time to re-litigate the anticompetitive na-
ture of the most basic evils proscribed by the antitrust laws. 214
B. A Greater Role for the Antitrust Agencies
Another innovation that courts can utilize in order to assure stabil-
ity in the development of antitrust law is greater emphasis on the
opinions of antitrust enforcement agencies. Most, if not all, of the
major antitrust doctrines are still developed by the courts. Thus, stare
decisis should remain an important constraint on rapidly changing
rules of law. That said, the Supreme Court does, and should, play a
continuing role in refining antitrust doctrine to make sure that compe-
tition policy serves its goals in the twenty-first century and beyond.
However, the Supreme Court does not have to act alone. Both the
DOJ and the FTC are active in disseminating research and opinions
about how antitrust laws are and ought to be enforced. Moreover,
both agencies make an effort to ensure that their opinions and data
are publically available. Thus, it is appropriate that the Court often
takes note of the antitrust agencies' views in deciding cases, and it
would be beneficial for that interplay to continue.2 15
Taking the antitrust agencies' views into account in deciding anti-
trust cases-especially in matters where the Court overrules prece-
dent-may help alleviate many of the problems that arise when stare
decisis is ignored. For example, reliance concerns underlying stare de-
cisis might be alleviated if the Court overrules a case in accordance
with the public opinion of antitrust agencies. In such a case, those
with an interest in antitrust matters would already be publically
warned against over-reliance on an established rule of law. Addition-
ally, the public work of antitrust agencies in reaching their conclusions
may simplify the case by allowing the parties to focus their analysis on
the issues as presented by the antitrust agencies.
For instance, in Illinois Tool, the fact that the DOJ and the FTC had
publically come to the conclusion that patents should not automati-
cally confer market power properly alleviated some of the concerns
that the Court would normally face in overruling precedent. The
Court stated that it found the common position of both the DOJ and
214. For example, "[v]irtually all criminal prosecutions brought under the [Sherman] Act in-
volve offenses governed by the per se rule." Kathryn K. Dyer & Garrett M. Liskey, Antitrust
Violations, 45 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 195, 200 (2008) (internal quotation omitted).
215. Some suggest going even further and giving an antitrust administrative agency greater
power to interpret the antitrust laws in a binding manner. See Haw, supra note 173, at 1285
(advocating a plan to give the FTC "the power to interpret the Act to an expert agency"); Crane,
supra note 45, at 1211 (advocating placing greater antitrust enforcement powers "to nonideologi-
cal, expertized, and problem-solving modalities"); Dibadj, supra note 172, at 840-60.
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the FTC convincing on the question of patents and that it mattered
that the DOJ and FTC had both publicized this information in materi-
als on their websites. 216 As such, there were already public signals
that patent cases might be treated differently and that reliance inter-
ests had less significance. Moreover, allowing private plaintiffs to rely
on legal assumptions that antitrust agencies have abandoned is argua-
bly unfair inasmuch as part of the goal of private suits is to supple-
ment the agencies' enforcement of uniform and consistent
competition policy. 217
C. Using the Facts to Anchor the Common Law
Finally, courts can enhance the continuity of antitrust law by engag-
ing in analysis that focuses on the actual conduct in question rather
than on potential or theoretical economic aspects of conduct.218 For
instance, in determining whether a particular economic arrangement
is in restraint of trade, the court should focus on the actual motiva-
tions and results of the economic arrangement, rather than asking
what potential or hypothetical pro-competitive virtues might result
from the practice.219 Focusing on the former will allow the law to de-
velop in a way that prohibits or permits particular arrangements with
attention to the facts or circumstances that tend to make a practice
more or less reasonable. Such a focus promotes reliance on the law as
people and entities know what circumstances favor a finding of re-
straint of trade. Additionally, focusing on the actual motivations and
results of economic arrangements obviates the need to overrule cases
inasmuch as each case is tightly based on the facts before it. In con-
trast, deciding cases based on hypothetical economic models has
tended to lead to broader legal rules. This practice, in turn, leads to
the overruling of prior cases when the hypothetical models change
based on novel economic understandings.
216. Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 45 (2006).
217. See, e.g., Joseph F. Brodley, Antitrust Standing in Private Merger Cases: Reconciling Pri-
vate Incentives and Public Enforcement Goals, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1, 13 (1995) (noting that "[t]he
substantive policy goals of antitrust enforcement remain the same whether enforcement is public
or private").
218. See, e.g., Christopher R. Leslie, Rationality Analysis in Antitrust, 158 U. PA. L. REv. 261,
341 (2010) ("Instead of focusing on the theoretical plausibility of the defendant's alleged con-
duct, courts should determine whether there is sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury
could conclude that the conduct in fact happened, whether rational or not.").
219. In a similar vein, some have suggested that the Court approach Sherman Act section 2
allegations by focusing on the "substantive competitive purpose" in question rather than "on the
outward form of allegedly anticompetitive conduct." See, e.g., Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., Identify-
ing Monopolists' Illegal Conduct Under the Sherman Act, 75 N.Y.U. L. REv. 809, 845 (2000).
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For instance, part of what precipitated the perceived need for over-
ruling the per se rules against resale price maintenance in place before
State Oil and Leegin was the new recognition that resale price mainte-
nance could serve potential pro-competitive ends. Moving forward,
however, the proper focus of the inquiry concerning resale price main-
tenance should not be on what an entity could do by imposing resale
price maintenance but, rather, on what it has done in terms of at-
tempting to curtail market forces or to promote interbrand competi-
tion. Such attention to the facts of each case will serve to promote
case-by-case adjudication wherein broad legal rules do not need to be
constantly reevaluated or overturned.
V. CONCLUSION
Antitrust law faces the formidable challenge of protecting economic
freedoms while at the same time keeping up with ever changing com-
mercial and economic realities. However, as the legal profession has
long recognized, the law must maintain some semblance of continuity
to maximize both efficiency and fairness. Thus, whatever substance
antitrust law takes, society will be best served by a doctrine that prop-
erly promotes coherent policy goals while not abruptly breaking with
precedent in each new case. To do so, courts-and especially the Su-
preme Court-should overrule prior cases only where there have
been meaningful and gradual shifts that justify legal change. By con-
trast, it is usually unsettling and unfair to overrule cases based only on
newer economic trends that point to theoretical justifications. On bal-
ance, the common law nature of the Sherman Act is best recognized
by allowing it to adjust in much the same way as the common law
itself does-through a deliberate process of doctrinal refinement.
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